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PJIENIIEN'iIAL INABILITY
MONDAY APRIL 1, 1D57

tl61tSI

(IFJ It I'llYNATiV E4,
,NTHEJ JUDICIARY,
COMAIhsiri:
1'hblm iJJnTiAl" I NAHIITiY,
Snw,(II SI t(?omiMltFJ* 'Po STItit

LINITRIn STTE

Washington, DA 6'

B8iI)CevijHJ( tt'i ijel, purti~il to cail ni 10:07 ft. mn. in roomr
( ioust' Offlkt, illditig, 1lon. I,' innia1 ('oiler elnirmnan
o th 6) 01d'
: 40Ni
Thii

of Hieo SItibeoiititte)

piresiing.
Present: Uteproseii(ti ve8 I'Kiiiet (Ceitel Otiafirnhin), F'ratcis M.
Yvnlte1r, Jnrk flrookEI, lKeImti6a It. K~ehlti g, all ( 1%liiirn im. MeC0iloc0a.
an -etmy re, -fnd WI iliii It. Folov, genera I consei
(~auIt,
(The coitinittee lind unadetm consideration t he following reollatiomn'

JO1INT It1H(I1.ITION irP 1.1101,ingninenrint t Iy11w tII~itm of UmeUnltA SI~Ic re1hting to

~nt

raaeswliere thel 1'1

Is unah!a to itschvarge the powers arml diatkg of fils office

Itrsolrcsl by ithe Sennfe and House of liereRCiltItimC. of the United StIairs of A merica
seniblefl (iwvo-tirds of reh House coneurring therelts) Tha
it (Congri
11 t tile followfhnenditneilt to tlie ("011 tlitfoil of 1 0 1.nited Staters,
niti1ttmits
as
'1lropoM'dl
nrih
Wa "I
An1(prorposo, us patrt of thle Gollssltutioa whlen
)Itll
Wi v'slid to nil

Witled by thie legislattares of thiree-fou rthi of Itle several Slte-;':
"ARTICLE-

"8Iftriox I. 111 cast of the remioval of [lit,' ir'idenit ftwin oWeie, or of Ills deftil
or Iresiguntion, thle Vice i'resdent shall become I.'reidorit.
unable to (ll~chmtrA the powers
'$m~e.
2. If thao Presidient htitloutces tiatdlhe 1I%
11(1Vce President.
tItildutiles tif 111ffollice, sttt'it p)owetrs and(duties shlld devolve oilth
l$aw. 3. Thea Coligresm mray by n colaialrrnt re~itation npproVed by two-thirdi
of each House, siggest tlint thle'lresident is unable to dischiarge the powers and
(Ititlff-of Is office. For tile plarluost of considering such iacoticurrent resolution.
thie Vice 1'resdeni. maiy conivene, the -teMiate mad the 81.eaker of the IJOIL of
hleprese11nntts maly conveneo the Ron."e of Itejre.'vntativ.-i.
"if thle Congsresm suggests thatd the President Is uionbie to discharge the powers
omeeo, tile Supremo Court AA~II doterinhie whether or not tile
and1(daime of 1ml,%
Pro.Ideltui Is abile to (Iiscilintic such 1)owes and1(lttle*. It time t111)r0111 Cotirt
tlcterim intht tile ilresidit i- iinaftie to (lk-imnrg(- suim PloWers andt dutieR, thoy
sinil devolyc on tlie Vice'lPreAd(Int..

"Su.v. 4., If Iltu owers and duties of the PrcsItiet ulevove br time Vice President

puIrsuant to section 2 or 3 of ills article *tho exercise of stich power and dutiest
54111111
not b)1 restlmled by the* President iumih thle Su remei Couti on the reques(-t of
Int Presdidet, deterilttes tlitt the Presidenut li at)ie to (1kehiarge the power and

4thmti~
of flsoffice.
"S8y:e. 6. The1 Congress may by law lImpleentt thle fort-going seetiomus of tis
I
article.
"Sse. 0. rThe Congress mnay by law provide for the ci.e of removal, decath,
resgIgnation or inAbily, bothi of tfhe' residemit and Vice PresIdent, declaring what
officer AhNl then act As P'resident, and suchi officr shiall act accordingly, untilI
the disabill ty be Omenot'ed, or atPre,41dent shall be elooted.
"18v.C. 7. Civille 0 of section I of article It of tile Contitutionm of tile Unrited
Stat es i. hereby repealed.

I'll P-81 DHNTI At# INAIIIIATY
448mv. 8. TI tin ntl Mo z4hal I m)l opply 16 it toy pormim lioldhig t1wollivoof I Iremideitt.
whoti flits no(elt, wit-4 proposed It%- We Cmigrmq.
-$0w.

11. Tills

firtlelo
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to
t(I'Voll'Al 114111tv.-A withill

1411oll IN% hiopimilve

milt-m I(

III(, C"oll-AIII III lon by
Sevell

yvilt4 from

slinit

flit, Ivg1,4jliWrt%t

flit, dato

tit

linvil lovvii

rittilled

of Ilirve-foitir(lis

Its;

or tilt,

It-4 Subill isill Ill."

III. J. 10.4. 'AM-Mill Colig , Ist
JOINT IMS4111,11OTIoN, 11(shlillot to Ilw ItI41114111 o( 11W Prosilivnit lodc-tekoll, lite
IX Allm

flesoll-rd 10.1i the Scmite flood 114)II-St, of

of thr 1101ited ovildr-11 of

Amcf-icti its CmIgIrs.4 el"I'wilbled, 'I'lltil. Ill Vast, or tilt%W1110vil (tit
police, or tit hN demb

111111mot

flit, I'mAdvoil

or to,ilgiialloil, Ow VIct, Proslilow Shall to villll

from

Pre"64,111'.

2. If flit%Pres1doW mmminvog flint lit, Is muildo III oil.-tv;,mrgv tilt, power
111111
q1titil",
Pre.-ItIvIlL
8vv.

:1.

of

his 0111m,

.4111011 I)mvc,'4

will

11tilit's A11111

111moll

tile,

Vivo

i

Wholiever

I he \ IVA% 11".41411vill or Illo ix-r.44111 11vNI

lit I Ito Illiv or 2411( . .-

Im.

thrit flit, Proslilmil, Air fhP INTS011- 010" Ill-.4011111 014
I Ito loowerr. mid Jullos kit mahl 4ifflets, ti4 IN% vik-so Wity Iv. N ittimble it) dischitrgo stild
Ivoul-N tillil 4111114", 1411011IK".oll -NIP'll C011vV110 11001 11011so-4 A)( tilt) (N)"Aro-m imil
amitimice that flit- powers alld 4111fivs of the offlef. litwit di'volved 111H)tl 111111.
Allmon [illy PPNOII
INce. 4. If flit, loowe"
11ml 111111t..'t of 11110 Pre'AL-111 ilt'volve,
lit

Ilw

Pro-tidetivy Im mils14

l

mi-rels4l. I)(
loreshiviii's

rl"Collilloll. tho
A of-tIlis
12 nild
-wellolls
14) lit,
N m"ittkill
ifflo"; MitAll
romitilml
Ioy fho
Port,%sidoid tilwit flit,
Ili,, abilily
mi4l 111(viltIoll 111vivilixill (to I-osilmo.

Suell

loowt'N

111141
of

lit. J. It(". WI.Mill Colig . 1-ti w'%1.I
11 IMOOLUTION 1111swhig all citiW111111W10 Its Ow ColIA1111114,111 of 11W Ittkilml SlAtm relMilig 10
(ww%bullock, 11%,Pov"Alcill 1% 1111.14%1011t-WIM190 I1W [4MVISMUI IttlikA 0l 11I.XtIll1w

)0I\

in

11'esolve.? hythr Scolatellpid Howce Ott Urpresentatire.4ofthe Vnitnt Slate-c tof America
gvvt (vixemblot (ttm-thirds qf rach House copireirdoill therciti), ThA tho (ill.

14mllig arilell, 1-4 11mi"sett 1w im
wilell

nitifivil

by

111111011(immit1o

t1le logislat uro:%it(

thret-Gitirl1w

tilt, C011,411111tioll of
of flit%st , vend

(Ike Pulted

Hinit-4:

44
to Sv(*r1t)X 1. Ill 10A,41L,
tit flip mm-mil of (he 11n,61dent from collie, or of Ilk death
or rekigtiation, flit, Vloo Ilm-4tIvid sliall Iwoomo President for flit,, imexpIrM portion
of fit%,, then curmil form,
11$rw-. 2. H Ow- Pre.4doid still doolaro lit wailing HIM Ito 1.411111%lile 14) disellorgo
tho owers mid dutlos ofl& offlex- imelt powers mul dollies Ainil lov, ditchuged lwy

f1w, Viet Prmidmit. im Acting
"$Kv. 3.

R (he Pro.4dent does not so deolaw,, flip Viet, ProAdviiI, If eallifled of

(lit, IWA4101WS 111,411111ty, allit-ii1wit nliproval lit wrlilug of n majority of (lit, livatis
tit 01,0011tive itelmrt tilt-, it Ut Who am Ilielitbem of the Proskletit's Cobluet., sliall di.q.
chArge tile wim. alid dullos of tho oflim ns Aelhig PreMdent.
"Sre. 4. Wilellover tho Prosilletit. declartm Ili wrlthig that Id-A limbility Is let1111liated, tilt, Phkitto.Ilt attliall forlitwIlit discharp

the

liowtvs and dutIO of 1;1.-4office.

"Srw. 5. I'llist article shall I)v Inoperative k1fil mm It sh"ll have becli rittiflc4l its nit
AllIentinloalt to (Ito coll-millitfoll by lite legislaturms or threv-fourths of flit%moral
malw*within seven poam from tile dalk iYf Its milmilssloil."

Ill. J. Ilm UN. S-Sth votts., Ist 'w.sml
JOINT

M-I1kvt1tvj an anwoomew to tho Consiltuilm of tho Voilloat States rvtilttig to Otto
Inswbility of Ibe PrMdent to tMcchwst, tho powers and adults of ht$ office
i

Rtsolivri by the Setink amd House qf Hirpresentatiresof the United Mates of America
in Compress trusemblM (hro-thirds of orach House emieurring therein) That tho (ollowIng artick Lcpm)IxxAx1 as an amendilletit, to tho collst It lit 1011 of t1lo 11111ted States,

PRESIDiNlNTlAtL

wtilell f4111011
be4 v'nlld (0 till intentsi
ititil )Isl0eL itt4 part of flni (oia
and
rallf tI1, lie legbiiat irv' of htrofirulw of th me'trtl Htatv'4:
4

1. 'iThat IIi(4I
viof

3

INABIILITY

till [oil wheun

(fiv' I're41ileit (roin ollive, or of lii
1're~dliti.
'8;.2. If I(he tresideWi. iitiinoie" flint lie N iitiiiblt' to (lisetiInrg(' the flowers
ittl dot liv. of flmi otflev, sitelt jKiWt't nd dIti
MlIMI fl(1VOIve tpoti fl. Vice
''vvgutg

tlhe rinuivill i

deh'll, or n-M&Aidti, fitn Viev I'roe1ttnt d1"l1bliit.

",re :1. Whelhoitver (lie' %'ici'1'rvsidlit or t It person n tiifhihue of snlteemloi
1o fte 'rt'iAliite Is snilmblle'dth Ifnflit, l'rv'i
ntf, or flii' j rso
~l ivitai
din'hiarglnj
f li%' liowevri nutfiilt'n of stild ollive, as tImlvtv~o uIv bt. Is 1analile to di1.ellArge Nallt
liovw~'i niid i 111(14, stiet' pl'rsoititl convene1
COIVIii
l t1I101l14'4 (if t it', Cofl) r84 anud
a11llii
11t1t.ui~
(lie po1weiv nid dluttt'14 of lite Office hiave' devolved tipoll 111111.
4$e
. If lIie liowears itud tlnlies (of I he IPresidenit deIvoilve oo
)0 Ally ipersoui
iiluuiilanI to twelloito 2 id :1 of 110-14
rt'eoiltoi, ft, e1ixirlg~ (f surb povero aint
dhiltbii 1srill hi' re.'uiiiie'd b%.(tou 1'res.ldlvnt Iljlii filie resideiit's. 11iinoiuileineiit, of
him~ nbliyvid Inte'ntion tliireuioii Ito remiiane.
'i4tx. h,. This nrilelt' shiall be Iiiolivrntivo uitsnl'
It s~hall have bet-i ratified as
fil 111ildinint to file' CImn iltlonl by (Ileg'lsAntuires of fliree-fourilis of the
i'ovieril tSin wiflttli sotivey ersit roiti (It
In. ihtt of itsl iiksos'

A Il I, 1,4'.' 4-WII int 11 Iv'it It* iteicriiet ii% itiitilhiy of n I,".Metcit
rne014'nr Ing mtPresident to

Areit erit toil
191
hr S'nude soul l16pi of Rtepresrentative of the. 1nitded NM/es of
iston o. x timirmh/ed, ThnI elinpier I of title :4(ofthe Ufnited Mtatem C.ode
is4Itiinif I n.4olos
(1) Add, at I lie end'iiif Ilii' nuinhysls4 of si'i elhapter, liii' following:
A1 uneri

1,21. lenihA101
kii tl

1bilit y ('ottitdsin."

(2) Add, tmni'lntely foltowlig (lit p~resenit

text, ftie following niew setlon:

"'(a) lPor file put 10-40 of dfloernihulg the(, liiabillt of file l'resideit, to dbechnrfe
(fI pow en'siu d iui Osof thei Offite oflProsillent, wI thin Mhe ieanIng of steetlon 9
oIf (flm-i 11th', therei lIm
hereby vistablished n coinitislttt to be' known as thp l1'resitoniIni inbilily Coiuinsslon (hiereinfter called Mle '(Coiniilm.4fon').
"1(b) 'Thtn ("01unauiissflu shall be c'olipmoe(I ex olielo of tenl nietaborN wt follows:
"(M 'l'it' V'iet, Presideint shrill serve its (I'inlnnu of flie (Coiniioslon Wit. If by
r'uisKOulit dent h, re.4l gtiutlou, re'novih fraii Olev, Iiniilt~y or fillitlr o q ual ify,
tlori NItno Vice l'reslont, or If fthie Vicm Prieslut hAtll Ion acting m. President, flhe
Individunal next III H~ne, of ticeesslout to the0 power; and dulie of tile Office of
l'rcsldetit, as defonnined It%setion 11) of thig title, shall serve us such Chalrmiln.
The ("hIiriaua 1111ill have nto vote InI flit procecdiigg of file Conitnisso.41
"()'I'tie ChIlef Jumtiee of lte thiulted States.
"(:3) ''hie senior AK,.ocIato Jutlcow of thei Siiprenie Court of (lie tUnited Blalet'.
(.)The S9peatker of the House of Ttopresentattves, bitt. If isuichi Speaker shall 41
tile Cluarinui of the Conuiinsslon, thle leader in (lit', Hlouse of flop nesentaltveA oW!
the pl~oitical parfy harvling thle great(-A, nurnber of Nieniberis of the House of
ltelresnltatives.
the House of Itepresentaflve.4 of file political party having
leaden finltnmber
'io grenfest
file"(6)
second
of Memnbers of tlie htotis of hleprosentatives.
ofde() The leader fit the Seiaate of the Political party having tho greatest number
of leinbem of thie Senate.
1(7) Th'le leader III thle Hepnte of the political PiartY having the second greatest
nuutnber of Memibers of thle Senafe.
(8) Tile Seen'tary of State.
:(0 The Secretary of the Treasury.
"(10) The Attorney (boom)a.
(o) Seven inenbem of tho CoinmnKtso shall coustititte a quorant. The con.
currenco tIII writing of at least six inembers shall be required for any action toDho
taken, or any determination mnade, by the Coinumlon.

PlIE8IIJENTIALe ANAMJLITY
14(d) Mllbom of the 'oieeitls,0oee shlenl Qervo un 14110li

ifthaIiL eolippeisilf [ile:

Wiet flet% sleull be reflicbirsedl (or fravel, seiftsisteicee, mcid oftler

ncemsary pxqweeve4

Ieierreel I)%-flite fit file ;xWrormlep of tlie uflee wvedli (I-lee
CouIeIkd~b'oe.
11(p) If, III itee opliloli of file l'remslrti, ie( Is tnmble (o (lischnrg Ito
fleIwwers
ned eiie of the 0111wc of I'resienct, lie pleceht so notify the (!Chlrimme of thle t'oceeeiilssloe by writteie coeiei111111eellulle
t reveijet of ntiv 81ete l il IIIileafltoll,
or eIpluil receipt of it CoiieeeiwIleat ioee front aie1)nv
(firme icettiirs of the minleeisslit
steatleig tlhat they- Iimite seifficeit ceetise tobefleve fith flm1rsidvent Is ceiceelo to
rfole
1
e
Vers awl ties of (tip Offlie of Presidentf, the Chinirui sleii
I((A0 The ('oliiketon Alhall seek vocilpecelit meIcAml nelvle as to 111 lectditflo or
(lie 1restetece did lets abelltt to dtkeleurge thle powel.Rs 111)ed
dii te of Ids offlie.. If,
basedl 11e)4)1
fe~iflclegs, thec' Coeeficii.0ssioii sliall eteletiilece f lint the 1'resleent is
tceiale to disele ite heolerm cited dities of thle 001cc' or I'reAdeeit , miuch powers
neddeies shiciu ft erceipoit devolve 11)1(ipo
the iiedividia next III hueiof sieceesioll
to the PrIdcele,
1"
am elteililed loeriseeciect to sretin 110
of (Ie,; tite.
11(g) UIn (elie
oIpinlil of (lee Priisieliet, lie Is able at ally ti11e0 to rC~Ls.4ilitv the
owwers ated dcette's Of fle (jice of t'iesidonii, tie Annd so Inotify thee yCh rnitree of
fle C'ommeissione 6by writtee roeeeeeeneleat(loll. lI)oce rocelpt of ceecy
such comeeutelCatiol, thle ('hiriiinee sh.41h Convence flie (Coeeceeehsioll wiitorct delay andt (lie ('oulliet.*Stoll All 0obt11in Coliptieleit iceed11il advice na to fil%Coinditione *of fle P'residenet
mied him nbihttv to dlischaeerilhe potter need uheefl of let 0111em If, Imiqed mipoce
Sueche
cidvice, thle ('OIeeiisioiN11 shll defercetno falithe dtisalhity lens beece removed,
and ftiat flee P~re-4ieet is able to reevieeeme thi e r id deites of te Offlee of
President, It shill teutify I lie Presidenct nmid fle I IIeee
aoret
lug h'resldeei of its (hvelsloui
by writtenc comueife, aitd ftee reshleeif seheill fle eacssieeee flee- lowers meeid
dettles of tlie 001ccv of I'resident.
11(h) Whencever any inielvltictal is4nclelig its Presieet, or leas ndced as h're~dect
jeec
rsaet to flee jerov-isici of wetoc 111)
of flis title, flee word 'P'resideint,'$ as uqsed
Iii tleis section, MhIAh be decerreed to rvfer to flint induividimcl uande
the wVord 'I'resldeiecv', as ived ci flis sectioni, sliath be deeed~ to ceenefle powers ned ditfes of
the Office of Plrestifeiif2

Thie

(e.CeIIAIRM
. Thle comneiltee w~I oill
inorder~.
Woare pleased to litve wit i us this morning the Attorney Oetierl1.
Mr. At torney (ieral, you meay proceedI.
STATEMENT OF HON. HERB3ERT B3ROWNELL, JRa, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY RON. WALLIAM P. ROGERS, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITtD
STATES

Mr. IBitowxt:.-m. Mt'. (linirnian, members of Ite commtiittee the

problem of inability of atPresident to discharge (lice powers and(I uties

of hiis office ini case of illnes or other unexpected emnergoey hans been
of serious concern to our Nation for- many y'ears. Itecently both the
executive anid legislat ivo brancies of our clovernnt have beon giving
intensive consideration to lte clarificftlon anid improvement of otur
constittulioeal system rehatin'eg to sutch. inability.
At. the direction of President. Eisenhiower, which was originally
v en some time ago, I bielievo in January 1050, t hcaye been conetuimg at special study ofithis problem and ami prepared this miorneing,
in response to thle in~vitation from this subcommittee, to present a
plan approved by htim. fle hias authorized me to Say titat1 inl his
opinion t action to amend theie (Constitution is requiredI to eliminate
unlcertainty and to provide for thie orderly condc.ogoe m ntn
time of future crises due to akPresid~nt.'s ability to act,. I am also,
aithlorrAe to say for him thiat. the plhan whieh' I will present, this
m1orni provided a workable and equi1table solution whkhe lie recoinmend for fAvorable consideration by tlie Congress.

PRESIDENTIAL 1INABILl

T

Y

Before readiglwi the ext of the proposedI coistitutiiloil a0 l(itnendnltl,
I will descrihrit(1( p.ii iepal provisions.
A niajor provision of tlie plan is to make it, 6liindantly clear tliiit,
in the evejit of a president's inability, the Vive President wOiIll sekve
only ns Acing President, and only' during the coiltInuation of 1ihp
Presidential inability, and the Presi(lent would resume fle exercise Of
the 11OWe01r finld dlti'es of his office as 80011 as ien was again able to act.
T ie plnif .. tutfkepirovision for two tpes of miliinfions which involve
'Presidekiifil inability:

'li fist is: If a'l'resldent should heconie uilable to discharge (lie
powers mid duties of his office and1( so (lelare tlint in writing, (lien the(
flico President would become Acting Presi((elit for tlhe period of

inability. Whenever (lie President is again able to act, lie could so
declaree and lie would thereupon resume fhie powers and duties of his
office.
It is nly opinion that, this provision, stani(ng by itself, would probably take care of most cases of Presidential inability; but, I realize a
second type of situation might arise in the event-'I'Ie (1AIRMAN. Do you mind being interrupted, or do you prefer
to conclude your statement first?
Mr. BROwN:LL. I will suit your convenience on that, Mr.Ghairman.
present my prepared stateIt might be well for me to go alead n(l
ment, but. whatever you want to (lo is perfectly all right.
'The CAIIMAN'. In the case of President Garfield, I wonderWhether
he was in a positioii to state in writing whether lie was disabled.
Mr. Bihow'mai., As we will come to it a little later, there weretimes
during that convalescent period whiei. wouldn't have been able to
do that. But, as I say, (here is a second type of situation which might
arise in the event tlht a President is unable or unwilling to declare
his inability, so (lint the plan provides for such case, and says that the
Vice President, if lie is satisfied of (lie President's inability, and upon
approval in writing of the majority of the heads of the executive departments, who are members of (ie President's Chbinet, shall dis-

charge the powers and duties of (lie office as Acting President.
Now, this, you will note, is not for action by tie Cabinet alone,
but action by the Vice President upon approval, in writing, of the
majority of the members of the Cabinet..
TiVi1eiAIIiMAN. May I ask who initiates it, there-tho President or

the Vice President?
Mr. Bitowi.EL,. It could be either one. I will come to it a little
later.
WVhenover tlie President in this case again becomes able to discharge

the powers and duties of his office, lie may reassume them by declaring
in writing that his inability has terminated; and. if we want. to go to the
extreme, ultimate case, where a President might endeavor to act,
although clearly unable to (o so I believe the present. constitutional
provisions for impeachment could be relied upon and appear to be
ad(leuate.
Now, just one other preliminary observation, and that is this:

That. this plan, even if it receives prompt and favorable consideration
by the Congress, probably would not become effective duringg the
second term of President Eisenhower because as we all know after
congressional approval, it has to be submitted to the various States
for consideration and action.
00832-57--2

PRtESIDENTIAL INABILITY

T11 IiiAIRMArj. Mr. Attorioe' Mineral, doesn't this arise front the
emergency of thle Presideit's illness?
Let.'s fAce facts. There is tiothilng personal about, the matter, but
1 don't lihlik the matter
would live been Vresented so pointedly to
the Nation, ni(I don't think the Presidentr likewise would have rflised
the question mid we certainly -mightnot have dealt with it as we have,
for a contslerable period of time were it not for the doui10le illins. of
tile President and II order to cope with that emilergenlcy.
Now, if we are going to have a co,itittittional aneindlient, isyou
indicate, tlilel we Are not covering, shall I say the present einergency
because of the illness of the Presitlent, and why should we wait,?
Mr. luowm
' i,.
Well, I will come to that inl soine detail as we go
along. As a matter of faet, I have a whole section of this l)reptired
statemelnt In which I deal wth that, subject; but I would not. agree
thant there i8 any present emtergelly, III
ally real se-se-Mr. I(EATINo.
u

hr. CIrlalrnl.

M\r. llnowxvFuI. That calls for aetion, and I would stress rather,
we mu st take the long-range viewin'llt on this for tile best Interests
of our countir in futture crises.
Tlhat. is the way- I woidd like to have us look at it.
Mir. l.Evrtxo. MNIr. Chairman.
The CIt
. I only stress tie point tlint this question might liot
have come u1l) at all were it not. for the illness of the President.
While an emergency is not it pleasant thing to contemplate, we arelet's face the f(ts- presented with a degree-let's put, it that wayof an emergency,
that
lndis why I think I got. actually interested ili
this matter.
Mr. KEAT No. Mr. Chairman., I don't agree we are faced With any
emergency and myinterest in this question arose long before the illness
of President Iiseihmower. I didn't have at.\ bill it, but I have been
interested in this subject. for years and I think we would make a great
mistake if we tried to legisl te here simply for any one President or
any\ one situation. We must, look at this objecti6ely, as something
wlich is going to stand for years and must stand the test. of years.
I have made telsIuggetion-and I will be glad if the Attorney
General could comment on it during the course of his testimonythat we proceed by a two-pronged attack onithis problem.
Most students fel, I think, that a law is suffilent, but,a great, many
students of the problem have indicated also that they thought a
constitution amendment ig necessary; and the constitutional atnenidment is the procedure advocated by'the Attorney General.
I see no objetionant not sure there is precedent for it, but I
see no objection-to our legislating and at the same time starting a
constitutional amendment through the process, which would, as the
Attorney General has said, take a good many years; but, Insuggesting
that I do not in any way mean to imply that there is any reason for
any hurry in this "matter. I don't, think that, exists, and I don't,
tlnnk that this committee should legislate with that thought in mind.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, this committee hias been proceeding at
a very leisurely pace oil this matter.1 There has been no hurry. We
have been wrestl ing with it since 1955. There has been no attempt
to hurry it.
I want: to say also, wen I am speaking of the statute or the constitutional amendment, this is not, Just to cover the present situation,
but it. is for the future also.
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I think that the present situation exacerbates this lack of specificity
on the part, of tie foundifig fathers in reference to article II, section 1,
clause 6.
I think we ought to jump into the bieacll and act, aitloigh not
hastily, buti net in a way that will n&eet the present conditions as well
as future conditions.
I am tinot
mnrried to any part icular plan, but I think we should act,
anti act. expediti6usly.
A (onstitutntf1 rlne
i~twould take probably 2 to 4 years or
at, best, probably 3 years. Some legislatures meet bianinually, and
the longer we wait the longer we postpone the decisionn, and the less
likelihood there will be any action.
I simply use this dillulcuty under which we are now laboring as a
means to propel thisthing to, s h1l I s.,y, quicker fruition.
Mr. WArIr. I tliiik it,
is a very unfor, inate thing that lhe 'President's physical condition should he associated with this legislation.
This is not, a new proposal. It has been suggested many years ago.
Nobody ever Went, to the limit., but. this is not a new proposal.
Mr.1BnoWNEL,. I thank the-Congressman for that statement
because I believe it,
to be true, and I think this subcommittee deserves
a great. appreeition for the facl they are seriously considering this
really as a part of realizing we live inan atomic age. *The Government
is makn g all sorts of plans for the orderly continuation of Government
in the event of emergency.
We have all of our relocation program
and a itiumber of other StAtutes that are. being considered, and(
anyone
who thoughtiilly considers the realities of the atomic age must realize
that the solutioh of this problem, of continuation of orderly govern.
meant in the event a President is unable. to act, is no longer to be consideredl as an exercise in theoretical constitutional law, but it is a
practical problem of government which must. be met, and without

undte (lelay.
Now, with those preliminary remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to come to the text of the prOlosed joint resolution for amendment to
the Constitution which I an presenting for your consideration today.
I will read the exact, language, if I may, and it is:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatires of the UJnited States in
Congress (wo-thirds of cach House concurring therein), That in lieu of so much of
paragraph 6 of section I of article II of the Constitution of the United States as
relates to the powers and duties of the Presidential office devolving on the Vice
President in the ma.e of the removal of the President from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the mid office, the
following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution, which shall be

valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the States:

"JOINT RESOLtUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Unitedt States relating
to cases wbere the Presklent Is unable to discharge the powers and lutes of his office
ARTICLEE --

"SEcrIoN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired portion

of the then current term.
"1SEc. 2.-

and now we come to inability"If the President shall declare Inwriting that he Is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
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"Six. .3. lWthe President does not so declare, the Vice President, If satisfied of
the President's Inability, and upon approval In writing of a Majority of the heads
of executive departments who are members of the President's Cabi net, shall discharge the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
"Ssc. 4. WVhenever'the President declares in writing that his Inability is terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and duties of his
office.
"Sre. 5. This article shall be Inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States within seven years from the date of its submission."

T'ihe CHAIRMAN. In section 3 you Wve the question raised in the
first instance by the Vice President, with the approval of the Cabinet.
In other words, the Vice President raises the question, with the
approval
•
Mr. BROWNULL. Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.
It might be better for me to go through with my description of my
thoughts on the plan. I am sure it will answer tlese questions as we
go along, if that is agreeable to you.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. BROWNELL. First, I would

note that this text would be stbstituted for part of paragraph 6 of section 1 of article II of the present
Constitution, and I think in order to have our problem cleitly in mind
I had better read that paragraph 6, section I of article I hi tho present
Constitution. The part that is underlined here in the text is the part
that would be eliminated and the new text that I read would be substituted for it. The part that. would be superseded reads as follows:
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President, ** *

The balance of this present provision would stay in, and that, reads:
* ** and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death
resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice President declaring what
office shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Mr. WALTER. 'May I ask a question at that point?
Mr. BROWNELL.
Yes.

Mr. WALTrEn. How would you enforce section 4?
Mr. BROWNt;L. That would be by declaration in writing by the
President.
Now this morning
Mr. k ATINo. May I just raise a question about section 3?
Mr. BnOWNE:Lj. Yes, sir.
Mr. KIEATi-Xo. The words "the President's Cabinet" are not found
in other laws, I believe. I could be mistaken.
Mr. BRowk.LL. There are a whole series of laws passed by the Congrm- establishing the heads of the executive departments, and we
ave taken this phrase verbatim from that series of laws.
There are 10 now, as you know; heads of executive departments
who are members of the President's Cabinet.
Mr. KEATIN.O. In other words does "Ihead of an executive department" apply only to a department whieh is established as such by
Congress?
Mr.BoWNEMLL. That is correct.

Mr. KEATI'O. In other

ords-
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Mr. BRO)WNELL. Just here in the past few years you have established
the Department of Health, EducAtion, and - welfare, and that became
the 10th executive department the head of which is a member of the
President's Cabinet.
Mr. KEATINO. Is a head of an executive department ever not ill the
President's Cabinet?
Could that happen?
\I. BitOWxELL. I suppose it could happen itthe President: de ired
to have it so, but there have been 105 years of history uniformly
adopting the Cabinet as being the heads of the executive (eI)artments,
who are recognized by the Congress as the heads of the executive
departments.
Mr. KEATING. This seems to leave a measure of control in the
President as to whether or not tley are members of the Cabinet.
Would it be objectionable to just say '"heads of executive departments"
without using that phrase "who* are members of the -Prsident's,
Cabinet"?
Mr. BROWNELL. I don't believe you would want to do that. My
Offhand opinion would be that the President shoulI have a certain
flexibility there.
Mr. KEATINO. My point is: Such an agency as, let's say, tho
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and some of the other alphabetical agencies are not, executive departments.
Mr. BROWNELL. None of them is recognized bv Congress as such,
'is heads of executive departments; no.
Mr. KEATINO. I am a little hemitant about. the use of the word in
a constitutional amendment, since it does not appear in other laws.
That is why I am asking the questions.
Mr. BROWNELL. I think you have a good point there, anid that,
certainly was our thought in putting in the phrase, which is so well
recognized by the Congress over a period of years, that is, "heads of
executive departments who are members of the President's Cabinet."
The CHiRMAN. We now have 10,don't we?
Mr. BROWVNELL. Ten; that is cOrrect.
Now, this morning I would like to divide my statement into three
parts: First
is a statement as to reasons why ac
tion in this matter
is needed;
Second is a statement of reasons why a constitutional amendment rather than a statute is needed; and
Th'd is a statement of reasons why the proposed plan is
preferable, seems preferable to us, to any othe proposals thathave
been made up 'todate.
First why is. action needed at all?
It is because there is now no. agreement c0neorniiug the stttis"and
tenure of a Vie: iPresident during tll o inabilit. ifihe Promident.
There are .re e.ted ''tWdents of the CNfistithioh who have ontended that 1the Vicd President would merely act as Presidenit f4* th6
duration of th inability, and there are other:iepekod it.udefittiif the
Cointitufioro Who haveargued that'ihe VicerPresident woidd'aetu*1ly
6ec6me Presiderit and rcpface the disabled Presidejit for 't.l,hiahiider
of the term.
This demonstrates, in ilself,1 'he: angedf iav"it Alib rliht o' exeranbtgitfyi' cofu
cise
power
:bedouded
thinkexecutive
_A.le
ni hitory
wobldl'y lustraewa,
h&'d-uio ,ayand'
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It, was soon after President William Ilenry lfarrison dked in 1841
that. Senator William Allen of'Ohio objected to the establishment, of
the precedent of the Vice President becoming President upon tie
death of tihe President. I)ecause he could see that, precedent would
complicate the situation In the future when a President became disabled aind, as Ie indicated, a study of the records of the constitutional
convention shows that a Vice President was not intended to become
President under the sticession clause. 'lhe succession clause caile
about in this way, find I think historically it. is interesting: When the
original draft, of the constitutional convention was sent to the ComIittee on Style, it contained two separate clauses dealing Witli Presidential siiccesson. One provided that. (lie Vice President shoul
exercise thosePresideitlal powers and dutiesand
flite other empowered
tle Congress to designate nit officer to act as President, in certain contingencies, and each of these two clauses was modified by a clause
Which would Ilimit the tenure of the Acting President to th dliratioli
of the disability.
Then, as I say, it. wont to the Committeo oil Style which, of course,
had no authority to alter substantive )rovisions, but merely to !ult
them in clear and concise language, and what they did is what resulted
in the ambiguity. They consolidated these two provisions into one
and introduced the phlraseology: "'thesame shall devolve on the Vice
President."
The committee used this limiting clause "until the disability be
removed" only once instead of twice, instead of using it to modify each
of the preceding clauses separately undthey changed the semicolon
to a comma so that. the clause would{ be a part of a continuous sentence
and .modify each of the preceding clauses, and this brought. about the
anbigiilty.
So, the records of Aho constitutional convention, it, seeIs clear,
vitiate the argumenitthat thopresidential office devolves oil thoeVice
President, who thereby becomes President for the renininder of the
term. But, regardless of tl- intent, of the framers of the Constitution,
remember that Seven Vice Presidents have, upontile dtinath of the
President, been recognized as having become- tOdo jure President.
and, as a resultof these precedents established whenever a President
has died, it scenes to be assumed without question that the Vice
President would become President and does not merely act. as such
when the Presidlent dies.
I believe that was Daniel Wesmter's view at the time of President
larrjson's -(eatji-ii other words,- that Vico- President Johili Tyler
actually bcuin6Preaident. Phis, of courso--this precedent' it), h case
of tie (lcath of the President-is what makes it easier to argue that a
Vice Preidenti
supqrse(les the PIesident whnioVer lie exercises the
Prcsidentfl power, whether ii hdblIty or ottprwiso.
T110 CIAIIIMAN. May I addalttlo b't of historythore, too, to that
idea and go lirtlier. When bills ware sot to 'l'kr, they were noted
a$ bills sent to lio Acting President and, very ang'ily wo are told
ho struck out the Word "Acting" nd tilsited upon his Ibefg eonsideeod
a.
4ndsigniig'of
tlit word "Aclig"p vas stricken outi quito a'number
of President,
imes oil the
it hiinbr f bills.
Mr. DihowNEM. WJIoQwho)vostruck
tlt out wit
his. pen, lie caused
ar6 discussing
His It
morilng.
a lag'prt offi "'blofi
As We will noo 'both intlOOarnflol and ti i6Wilsl'i Cases, the Vice
President> was not asked t6 Id a Presideht largely beauso of'ftho
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fear ihat lie wouldhbecome President and would thereby oust. for tle
remainder of tile term (ho incapacitated incumbent,. As a result, the
full extent, of (lie disability was (arefilly guarded in both of these
cases because of pelisopal loyalty to the (isahled IPresidont--and,

more imlportalit', the public ilierest, couhl not help suffering from having ntvoactive President hi both of these cases.

i would remind you President. (larflehl lhigered on for 80 days
after he was shot on July 2, and during this period lie plfiorniMe(
only one official act-the signing of an ex~raditloif-papor. Although
hismind Was clear during thefirst. days of his ivolidistn, lie was 1iincoilscious nit(d it was reported that. lie sit'rerkt from ifilhlcinal l11 dlling
tho last days of Ins illness and hIe was physically unable to (llahirge
the dlties of his oflice6 -(hlrg, substantia part. of that 80-dny period.
I don't thilk it. could seriously h1 contend ed there was no importaiit
busiem during tOha, time because history shows that officers were
unlable to perforlitheir dities because the Presidlent was uinaible to
was a serious crisis in our
commission them, and at that, tiueIhre'o
foreign aftairs. Yet, (lie department heads transacted only such
rotline business as could be transacted without (h0 Presidelnt's supcrVision, And it, was claimed that ipoll'ta, questions of Ib1ile policy
which could be decided only by (he President Were sinlply igiiored.
Another important, factor here is that public opinion was sharply
divided about the manner in which the public business was being
handled-fa ratherserious ing fora time of crisis.
Mr. K.:A'rTo. That. is trIi0 today, too.
Mr. BRowN:LL,. I imagine tlat 'is right, ('ongressman.
'T'le ('1AINSIAN. It )Oints U), too, ill view of the tillies in which we
live, the need for cerfa61 action to cover (lite situation today.
Mr. Browi:L1.. Yes. 'hat is-..we had
that lifiltilty
of Oarfleld
time show
(J!AiIMAN.
T1he
event more
(Iiflililties,
whiich
out., During
andt ourthe
records
us yotlpointed
aro all tle more reason for action, iow--lmr.
chairman .
Mr. BuowN.:Jt,. I agree withtiat,,
And that we should nbt. wait to have a coisstitu'Pl(nie (AlWAN.
d
tional amendment adopted.

,

,

Mr. BlIowNi'1m,. That was the point. I was trying to iake to Coligre.sman Keating, of course. ,While it. is true public opilioli is always
divided about howv public btsiss is transacted, in timile of need Wnd
national crisis it is Iniportait. to minimize that. to tho extent we can
(1o so; and I believe we can do so by settling this problem tiow.
Mr. KCHLATINo. In furtherance of what. the (Chatrialn has said-I
feel strongly on this: That, while I have felt. a Iqow was sufficient. arid
a constitutional atineUeI11111. was not ilicessary, if I become convincled
to the contrary, that. tie constitutioial, aineudmiit. is neiee atT, I
don' think that this conuUtte should simply pass a law, if the JlIdgilnont of (tio committee is that onstitutional a lneue is necessary
just Iecauso of speed. I think that, is a secondary consileration, and
1 hikMr. Ifitow:m. I am glad to hear you say that, aid I 1opp 61-...
N4r. I:ATINo. WO should put tle eniphlAis upon doig the ihlig
rihit,
(is lto... 1 tlnik (lie reason why we vould have to have a
'lltoaatChiRiAN.
constitutionall 111elln1t, if at pit is because of the suggestions that

have. beon mado'concerning inability of cotllissions or (te Cabinet
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O&' some such similar group to be constituted to ra~se the question of
inability aihd to solve that situation.
Tlere is an express admonition in the Conititufotl that inithe event.
of the inability of the President the duties shall devolve upon the
Vice'President. 'He must take-over. He has no choice in the matter.
Therefore, there can be no interposition of any kind of agency or
group
or commission
wfich would
have
the discretionar
to
sa., whether-ho
can or cannot
take over
because
this is a sohd,power
straight,
miinhibited cominntid to the Vice President to take over, and tIere
chn be no othdO agency.
So, if you are going to have any commission or any group determine
that,, you must have a constitutional amndment.
M point of view is: We don't need the constiftitiftil amendmndeit
because we don't need the commission. I think'the Congress has
Ample reserve powersby article I, section 8, which gives the Congress
power to- make all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution all the powers under tie Constitution. I think iler that. power
Congress can act,, and for that reason and for the other reasons Ihave
indicated I thiik a sim ple law is fill that is necessary.
XMr. KEATIUX. Mr. Chairman, my point is this: I know that you
advocate allowing the Vice President to say when the President is
disabled and to take over, and I have respect, for your viewpoint, in
thiat'regarl and-I woild-much rather acceputhat, than nothing at. all,
but the main thing is to do something, in my judgment. Tie method
is a secondary matter.
I have felt a commission was the best method. The President and
Attbrnev General have advocated members of the Cabinet. I do not
necessarly agree.
I think it was Professor Corwin of Princeton who said: "If anyone
intervenes, there must be a constitutional amendment."
I lean with yout that any of these methods can be done by law, but
my point is ths: Whatev;r method we select as best, whether that is
to be done by law or constitutional amendment, should not be a
cofitroling factor, It should be a very minor factor.
If we decide to interpose the Cabinet as the best or have a commission as the best method, and that requires a constitutional amendment, we should not b6 deterred in that by the. fact it is going to take
2 or 3*or 4 years to get, it through.
Mr. BRoWNULL. I agree. Mr. KEA1r!NO. We should not lean toward a method which favors
law
over a constitutional amendment, unless we feel that is the best
ethod,
Now; I am very much open-minded on the approach to the method.
I, aturlly, like the authorof anything, think"tlihr,
tny own suggestion
mnlht have more merit than someone else's, but I am very ready to
field on that to the necessity of action, and in thit, action we must
eid this question not upon any specific situation, but with complete
objectivity.
Mr. Bw .LL.. I agree with that.
Mr.'WAMrER. Did t he Attorney General, by an-v chance, see the
committee report, which this subcoinmittee issues on the 26th of
March eodtaningin annlysis'bf the replies to the questionnaire which
WOas'sent tothe auth6itli in this field?
Mr. Brtow4ELL. I saw last year's report. I haven't seen this.
I
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Mr. WAurER. This is new, af
I respectfully suggest that you
examine B on page 03. You will find many of the authorities, including Professor Corwin, as Mr. Keating just mentioned, agreeing that,
legislation could meet this problem.
.
Mr. BROWNELL. Well Congressman, in a moment, I am going to
devote myself exclusIV-dy to that discussion, as to what. method we
should apply here, whether constitutional amendment or statute, and
I have what I hope are soine rather appealing arguments so far as we
lawyers are concerned as to why we- think the constitutional method
is needed; but I think before we get Into that, if Imay, I would like to
spend just a very few more minutes on stressing theo-ned for action
because, as we know, some people have taken the position that there
is no need for action. They have taken the position: "Oh, we have
struggled
and got by in crises for 105 years. Why do anything
about,It'?"

I think, in order to realize the importance of this question, it is

necessary for me to spend just a few more minutes in describing these

historical incidents so that there cai be no question inthe mind of
any members of this subcommittee that action is needed, and thien we
we will come to the question of method.
Mr. KEATINO. We are living in a different world from 105 years ago.
Mr. BROWNELL. That is a fact.

The CHAiRMAN. May I just ask another question: I think you had
indicated you would look up the question of whether or not we haVe
ever had a situation where we offered a bill and a constitutional amendment covered the same subject at the same time. Did you have a
chance to do that?
Mr. BROWNELL. Yes, and that is in my statement this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. You have?
Mr. BROWNELL. Yes.

To go on with the Garfield incident, you will remember after ,his
illness had dragged on for 60 days his physicians thought he would
recover, but his convalescence was expected to take another 60 days.
So, .the Cabinet considered the Vossibillty of asking Vice. President
Arthur
act as President during Garfield's recuperation. All 7
Cabinet tomembers
agreed on
desirabiity
4the
of having him act as
President, but 4 of the 7 thought that Arthur s exercise of Presidential
power would actually make him President for the remainder of theterm and thereby oust Garfield from office- and it wa6 reported that
the then Attorney General Wayne MaoVeagh shared these views.
So, the inevitable result, which always will happen, I believe;, under
the present'system, was that the Cabinet decided that"arfield should
not be advised to ask Arthur to act as President without first telling
him of the possibility. Therefore, the whole matter was deferred
because the physicians feared that the shock caused by such a discussion might result in the President's death. As, you Will recall,
President Garfield died on September 20th, making it unnecessaryto
solve the problem in 1881 and the whole matter was dropped until
'
1
President Wilson became iii in 191.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Attorney General, you omitted in your statement the mention of the New York Times and the New York Herald
Tribune and"the Boston Evening Transcript, and I notice represent
atives of those papers hero and I am sure you want that eluded
in your 0a4-transcript.
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Mr. BROWNELL. I do.

I thank you for that,.

That was overlooked in answering sone of the questions.
Mr. McCuLLocin. Of course, I cannot lot this occasion pass without
reminding my goo frind -front Now York that, part of America lies
west of tio, Allhonies.
Mr. BnoWNELL. As a Cornlhusker, I will agree with you on that,
Congressman.
Now, in furtherance of this first, point that I Anm trying to take
here-that action Is necessary in this inat.ter-let's lake up the
President Wilson incident.
There can be no doubt, that President Vilgon was actually unable to
perform the duties of his office during at least, some of the p~erioI ofter
bis collapse which strtod on Soptember 25, 10 0, and did not ond litil
a year and a half later at the nd of his term on March 4, 1021.
As evidence of this inability, it appears that dluring tho special
session of the 60th Congress 28 acts became haw because of the
President's failure to act on thent within 1ho requisite 10 days. TIhe
record,hows he passed on only I of the 10 acts that were preellted
to him between October 28 and November 18.
The Senate Comittee on Foreign Relations repeatedly tried to
get the President to take some action or supply the conmmitteo with
some information about-the ShaimttwIg settlement, blit, the committee
request went unanswered.
These facts aroonly part, of the evidence that the President, was
disabled, in fact, during a part of this time and, more important, this
inability occurred when the Senate was debating the Versailles Treaty.
The exact degree of the inability is uncertain, but I think it is quite
clear he suffered from a stroke and his loft siode was paralyzed, and
there is very good ovidonceo that he was unconscious or at least only
semiconscious during a part of this illness.
Whatever Wilsons condition, Vice President Marshall and the
Cabinet were not fully advised concerning it, and the President's
family and his White House staff and the Cabinet discharged public
business in such manner and by such methods as they deemed appropriate.
History indicates for example, that Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Cary T.
Grayson, the President's physician, played an important part in the
solution of many questions of public policy.
Students of this period seen to agree that official papers were given
to Mrs. Wilson, who sometimes passed the papers on to the Secretary
of the Treasury or to someone else in whom sle had confidence.
Soon after Wilson's stroke the Cabinet Joined with the White House
staff to keep the Government operating. Secretary of State Lansing
called 21 Cabinet meetings to transact executive business; but, as a
matter of fact, these meetinp were said to have been held for nearly
4 months before Wilson even hoard of them.
Although Lansing's action doubtless had an effect on an congressional move that mNght have been made to establish the President's
inability, you will remember that President Wilson accused Lansing,
of usurpmg Presidential power and forced him to resign.
One other footnote on the history of that time: Patrick Tuinulty
Wilson's secretary, reported that Secretary of State Lansing ha
suggested that, in view of the President's inability, they should ask
theVico President to act as President and he quotes himself as saying:

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Yoii inay rest assured that while .Woodrow Wilson Is lying In the White House
on tho broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him.

'Tiun lky al.o reported that when Lansing resigned, Wilson said:
'i'umulty, It 14 never the wrong thne to spiko disloyalty. When Lansing sought
to oQust me, I was upon iny back, I am on my feet now and I will not have dis.
loyalty about mo.

Because of (Ili belief that the Vice President would actually become

President. for the balance of t.he term and the President, would- be
ousted, asking Marshall to act, as President during Wilson's inability
was viewed as disloyalty. The President's friends didn't seem to
think that Marshall would remain Vice Presidentand merely discharge
the Presidential functions during the inability. So the 'result was
what we would expect-that theylookd at. Marshall with antagonism
and viewed him as a possible usurper instead of viewing him as a
person who could lighten tho disabled president's burden; and, instead of asking himi to exercise the powers devolved upon him by the
Constitution, they attemnpted to keep th6' Government operating in
their own way in order to forestall any serious attempts to declare the
President's inability.
Now it seenis to me a study of these two cases--the (larfield and
the Wilson cases -shows there'is a real need for a means of supplying
an active President during times of Presidential inability, and it is the
relief that (lie Vice 'resident actually becomes President, for the
balance of the terni when called upon as such which has nullified, for
practical effect, the conslitlitional provision for the administration of
government, when the President is lncapacitated.
'Th1e CHAIRMAN. I think on that we are all in accord, Mr. Attorney
General.
Mr. McCuv,.ocn. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Attorney
General, if it, is his studied judgment, section 4 of his proposal will
nullify or neutralize all these feelings that. are so eloquently set out
here on the part, of Cabinet members and friends an appointees of
any President.
Mr. BIRowNEba. That is the principal purpose of it.; yes, sir.
Mr. McCuLOdn. 'Tliat is your studied judgment---Mr. BRowNraz. Yes, sir.
iM.
Mccummoo. That. the loyalty which is engendered by the consideration given by a President. will Ihe completely neutralized by section 4 of your proposal?
sir.Mr. IBnoWNIL.L. Taken in combination with ihe other sections, yes,
It is thIs problonll.of providing for the exercise of Presidential power
during periods of inability which would not be solved merely by providing a means by which the inability could 4e established, for nless
the Presidmt and his Cabinet and his other friends and tie public,
I might add, are absolutely certain of the President's status after the.
termination of the inabilitv, they will tend to oppose any attempt to
declare the existence of tle inability, because they would view that
as a declaration which was equivalent to removing the President from
office.
To answer Congressman MeCulloph's question specifically this
problem, We believe, would be solved by sections 2, 3, and 4 f Iresdent Eisenhower's suggestion, which provide that the Presidential

powers and duties shallbe, discharged by the Vice President as Acting
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President and that the Vice President shall discharge the powers and

duties of the office as Acting President, and the President could come
back under section 4.
So, with this history to guide us and with the realization of new
hazards, the continuity of governmentt duo to the atomic ago, we must
concludo-and I am delight.ed to hear the chairman say so, and I
believe it must he the unanimous opinion of any. lawyers who have
studied this problen-that action is needed to solve this problem of
Presidential inability.
Now it seems appropriate to turn to tho hnportant question of
whether this can best be done by a constitutional amendment or by a
statute.
There is no doubt that some students of the problem have argued
that a statute or concurrent resolution which declares that the ice
President merely acts as President ad interim would be sufficient, but.
there is sharp division of opinion on the question as to whether such a
statute would be constitutional.
What I am endeavoring to point out to you in this section of my
argument is this: That we are not endeavoring to say who has the
better of the argument; we are trying to eliminate the argument before
it arises.
Now, to understand the basis for this division of opinion which
arises-and it is a very serious ono-I want to call attention to the
different phraseology in th6 present Constitution of the first half and
the second half 61 paragraph 0 of section 1of article Ii, which we have
quoted previously. This is the way the first half reads:
In dse of the removal of the President from office or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of tue said office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President.

Now, there is no express reference to any action by Congress.
Let's look at the second half. The second half reads this way:
* *-* and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
offieershall then act as President and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a Preslient shall be elected.

Note, as I say, that in that second half it is specified that Congress
may act-and that, I think, is the basis for these arguments that are
being made.
I don't ask you to agree with it or disagreO With it, but I do want
t6 show you that sincere students of the Constitution have disagreed
as to this and I don't think we can stand for that kind of disagreement
in time'of erlis when we have a chance, as we do now, to eliminate
that Alimient before the crisis arises.
The U AIRMAN. It shows also, in the first instance, what action is
limited,
and,
in the second, limited to the
Cong ross.t Athe Vice President
.
.
1There is the clear indication i my mind that it was the Vice
President who was to raise the question and the Vice President was to
reolV6e the question.
SFrankly, if Mr. Arthur and Mr. Metrshall had taken action in those
d#§, 6n question would have arisen today. They could have easily
satdiunder the first part. of that sctil;i 1, article'i, that they had the

pover "to raise the question; theyhad the power to assume the duties,
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and they did, and they were going to assume the duties. They would
have been imminently sustained inthat, argument..
Mr. BROWNELI. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, but the point I
am trying to make is, while you and I may think one way, there .tre
very eminent people, whom "Iwill cite here in a moment, who think
the other way, aM as long as you have that stalemate and opinion
you are not going to get any Vice President to take over; you are not
going to get any Attorney Oeneral to advise the President that he
should tt'fii over the powers.
The CIIAIAMAX. Oh, I agree with you on that.
Mr. BIuOWF.LL. You are going to have critical conflict in public
opinion at the time, and why should we, risk that when we can now
settle the matter before the crisis arises?
The CtAIRSIAN. I couldn't agree with you more. History shows
there was a reluctance on the part of Marshall and ArthurtO take over.
They were not usurpers. They were fearful that they might be called
usur1pers.

XMr. BRoWNIELJ.

That is what I meant to imply.
The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it is not the danger of the usurpation of
power. It is the danger
Mr. BibWNELL. They won't act.

The CHAIRMA.. They won't use the power that the Constitution
gives them.
If you agree with me that they had the right, to do exactly what I
indicated in those cases without a constitutional amendment, why do
we need the constitutional amendment now?
Mr. BROWNELL. Because of the precedent that has been established
in the long history and the 6ig history that has flowed from it.
The CHAIRMAN. We can show, with the proper leadership and
proper guidance of public opinion, that those actions, those precedents
were wrong.
Those precedents doi't necessarily bind us or bind the future Vice
President who believe that Arthur and Marshall Were wrong; but
surely, if you admit they had the power to do that in those cases, in
1881 and 1919, they have a right to do it now without a constitutional
amendment.
Mr. BROWNELL. Le

me go on with my argument, if I may, Mr.

Chairman, because I think -I can show you there is very respectable
Argument the other way. I may not agree with it, but as long as that
conflict exists I am sure you will not get the action you need in time
of crisis"because nobody wants to take a chance on it; and the question
of settling that problem as we lawyers know, cannot be settled, cannot even be 6(Arted, until the crisis arises, so that you have that period
of uncertainty there which is so unfortunate.
Tho CHAIRMAN. Wouldn'tthat reluctance that'you agreed with me
was present be dissipated If Congress would simply make the declaratioli that the Vice President shall in the case of the disability. as a
result-of the question which he raised and resolved, step in and take
over th0 duties?
Mt, BROWNELI. Not as I see it,Mr.Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The fact thft dongess so stated would be encouragemient for him to come to that c64ncgusion.
.1 a1in sure public opinion would dektrmine if he was wrong. There
is always the power of impeachment in case he was wrong.
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If he was intemperato and was not taking proper action-ho would
be very careful; I am sure ho would-impeaclnent would curb any
kind ofi excess, any kind of usurpation.
I think this resolution would iesufficient to do away with a roluctanco to assume the power.
Mr. BRoN ,,vEij.
I think your first. point po'rhaps is right. It,
might
give some encouragementt, but it wouldn't settle the problem because
we are not dealing with a question of statutory intprpretation. Even
if the statute is passed, you still have te questoll of its constitutionality anid thb same arguments would be made to that, point as are
being miade now; and that is thoreason nobody waits to make {Clie
move. Thoy would stir ipa |ot ofltlgation right at the tie of crisis.
Now, if w'e can settle this thlng once and for all, by clear language
in the Constitttlon, itself, 1tenwo will have surely solved thme Probliem.
Mr. WAt, ER. I would be inclined to'aIr'eo wit you, Mr. Brownell.
Mr. BROwNEiLL. I would like to lprocei with a case where tie question of the validity of the statute would be raised.
Mr. WALTER. Who would raise that, question?
Mr. BRowNEIL,. I have several citations of flint, as we go along here.
Would you prefer to wait until it,
comes in thoprepared statelent?
Mr. WALTER. I agree with y7ou. Unless we cold visualize tlat, we
shouldn't worry too much about it.; hNt I foresee cases where It would
arise.

Mr. BRowNEL,,. Now, let ine give you the argument of thie people
on the side of the argument that"(ie Aice President becomes President
for the balance of the terni,
A few weeks after Oarficld's death a man namtd4 Charles WV. Jones,
of Florida, asserted in the 47th Congress that inability has the same
effect as death , resignation, or removal. In all foir cases he argued thme
office devolves on th Vice President, who thereby becomes President.,

and he argued that. if Garfeld had lived and Artlur hiid been forced

to exercise Presidential power during-the President's recuperatiou,
Arthur would have displaced Oakrfleld and would have served for the

remainder of the term because, ho said, once a Vice President is seatol
in the Presidential chair hme has all timopower that.is given to the President by the Constitution and he cammot be displaced except by im-

peachment for high crimesand misdemeanors.
, t
Senator Jones beliov'ed, inotler words, that a constitunal amendinent would be necessary if a Vice President were to servo only, for the
duration of the Prosident's Inability and, as tihe Consltuon now
stands, hne argued, the Vtc. Presidentmet.serve for tho remainder of
the term; and lie offered three arguments in support of his position:
Firet, sino. the Constitution inakes no distinction between a
vacancy and inability, a Vice Presidefit would become President
in case of inability, 'just. as ho would in case of the President's
death;
Second, lie a uod that the vesting clause of article 1I excludes
the posi billtyo ,ha-i"two Presidents at once-one acting and

tie other disabled; a6d

Third, lie argued that the clause "until the disability, be re.

moved" limta only the temire bf an officer other than th6 Posident or the Vico Prsi(dent. w%'lmo acts, as Presidot by statutory

designation, but It 'doesn't. linit the'tonUre-6f the Vice President..

1t me cite you another oxamplo of an arument fJom a sound
authority in.favor of the position that., as the Constttion" now
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stands,

the Vice President could

tot.

Y

act. merely for the dinirtilon of

tile inability, but. would become Presidetit for (he remainder of the
term.

During Gartiold's illiiesq former Judge Abram J. )i ellnhooffer said:
I start with hi4 voielisiou: 'i'lat whenever the Vice Pre.ldent gets lawfully

into the Presideney the President get4 Infiully out of it. There cannot lietwo
lawful lPresIdents at themme time. Mark, no limit to lho for which these powers
md duties "shall devolve" Is fixed. It is just as nihsolute aid Iimitles, as if the
langtlage of the Con1stittion| wer:
"In case of the removAl of lthe President fromn ollice, or of his death or resignation
or Inability to diseharge the powers and duties of sAid oliitce, ihe
Vice President
shall b)eWOIUe PreshelOt."
And when the Pres.Ident gets lawfully out thre is no way Miiwhich he can get it
again.

''his line of arguillelt wlic
(Olnlusion

wimisuch

l)itteihod'ier used to subsilantiate thig

tho same as thlit used by Senator Jolles.

Anotler resfeed authority, Theodore W. Dwighl, profesor of
con-liuationA law at Columbia, took tie same position.
At. (ho timie President Wilson went over to the VeNsailles Conferenco,
inllis Taylor, who was aolther resieied conslitutional lawyer,
argued tiis way:
And here the fact should b, emphasized that tneither the Conslitutio nor the
Presidential Succssion Act. makes o11 Iprovdilon for a Prcsident of the United
States pro telnpore. After the Vice P'reshlent hlms beett sworn in as President,
he becomes sech In the full sense of the term. No iurovlsiou is made by law
uider which he can hnuid back the presidential office to hl. predecessor.

Now, 1 (don't hn p0,1 to agree with this line of argumentthiat is
offered by Mesmia. Jones, Dittenhoeffer, Dwight, Taylor, and numbers
of others. Although I think their arguments can be answered very
effectively, I don't go into the merits of their arguments at this tine
because I want to make this point: That a number of respected constitutional authorities have argued that there can be no temporary
devolution of presidential power on the Vice President during periods
of presidential inability; and, whatever we may think of their arguiments, I think that. a statute would not protect the Nation adequately, for the doubts that have been raised have been raised too
persistently.

As long as there is dolbt lingering doubt, concerning the constitutiofinality of the statute, as long as there is a question concerning the
disable President's constitutional status after his recovery, I do not
believe any in"abilty, as a practical matter, however severe it may be
wofild b're ognized lest tihe recognition of that disability ould
oust the (isabfed President from office. Moreover, a presidential
disability, severe and prolonged enough to warrant the devolution of
presidential power on the Vice Presia ent, would create something of
a crisis itself,
.
Sol the Onstitution should be clear and there sliould he no room
for disputo"6bout its meaning, for that is the very time When the coiuitry should be ilted and the very time when a Vice President should
have general support.
IVQ must remember that the constiutitonality of such a statute just
couldn't be tested until tdie inability arose, and it is the very Uncertainty and confuson at that tinme that we' are trying to avoid. That
is another"reason why a constitutional amedinet is preferable to a
statute, oven if we iilt it., as the chairman suggests, to merely a
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declarationihat he Vice President is to be Acting President and only
during the period of inability.
Now, what if we go further than that,, if it is-proposed to go further,
ad declare that, some person or soino group o persons or a commission, other thaI the Vice Prcsident, should participate with hin in
tile solution. of this question or decision as to when the Vice President
becomes Acting President?
For example, would we need a constltUtlonial aenondment, if my
proposal is adopted, which wou ld provide that when tle President. is
disabled and faiNs to declare his inability, tle Vice Prosident 'Iltis a
Majoi'ityv of t.he Cabinet should declare the existoce of the inahillty?
I agree with the chairman. I don't think this section could coltstitutionally be embodied ri a mere statute or concurrent resolution,
nor could any, plan that. involves the creation of an inability commission or an, plai that involves the'determlintion ofinability by, the
courts. Thoso would certainly y have to be done by consttfiliional
amendment, and I think it, is inmportant to go to history for a little
instruction on- thispoinit,..
At. the time of President Oarleld's illness i 1881 the great. weight
of opinion favored thoiierrtation that Vieerdhnt -Arthur, and
lie alone, could determine that the President. was disabled. . At. that
time most students of tho7Constitution said that the Vice President
was obligated to exercise the powers of the Presidency during Garfield's illness, just, as much as he was obligated to preside over the
Senate or perform any other constitutional duty, slid that no enabling
action bv the courts or the Congress or the Cabinet was necessary.
Since the Vice President had ihe dutv of acting as President, it was
argued, imf-cortain contingencies, his ofticial discretion extends to the
determination of whether such a contingency Acttually exists. In
other words, thiey Were applying the Well-known rule o f lav that in
contingent grants of power the oneAb whom the power is grated is to
d~eide when the emergency has arisen.
The CAIIIMAx. Don't you agree with that statement.?
Mr. BRoWNELL. I do.
The CHJAUTMAN. If that is the case, and the Conititution vests
that power in the Vice President, he is the one to whom the power is
granted, and, therefore, the Vice President must decide wien the
contingency arises.
Mr. BR0WNELL. That is right; but I think it shouldn't depend on
has a title back 61 his name. I think
one man's onion, even if ieo
there should be a constitutional provision which would make it so
clear that we couldn't have this kind of debate.
Mr. KEATING. Yes; but it also seems to m-,I say this with the
the utmost respect-that the chairman is getting' the cart before the
horse, because it seems to me our committees dtty Is first to determine

the iethod by which we think this' disability should be detorm ined
then to decide based upon that, -whether a law or constitutional

amendment is thedesirable approach.
Now, there probably is merit to the argument--just leave It to the
Vice Piesident, which is more likelY6 give warrant to a law as against
a consttutional amendment-bu 'don't think that should be an
argument in that respect. I think We should first determine how we
are going to do it-whether we are go ng to adoptthis plan or some
other pan-and then determine ,Whether it should be by law or
constitutional. amendment.
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Tie C(IArIRMAN. I agree with you. I think we want. to determine,
fir st, whether it should be by law or constititional amendment.
I lave cofne to the cotiduslon, after a short. dehbrioration, there is
sonie law ahl( )recedence, after reading all tile history, thit all thit is
necessary is for the Vice Pes(leitr to let.
Thisi ,very stateelint lht tie Attorney Genieral reaIn:
It i a wcill-estal1lih,( ruile of law thint it contingent graiit-; of power the one
to wholti the power Is graned N to derlde when the emergency has arisen-

leads lie to the inevitable conclusion that, since tile grant of power
is to tlie Vice President, lie (eterlines the colmtingency upon which he

exercises the power.
Mr. McCuLL'ouli. M,. Chairman, if I would follow that conclusion
one stop ftrlier, could I say that, il your opinion, there is no need for
auythilig-th authority now exists, and it. is only the problem of
having the Vice President act, when lie should?
The OnAMMAN. LegallV, you are absolutely correct; but there are
those doubts in the cases tfiat we have ha(d illustrated, the cases of
Marshall-and Aiethurh, to assume that, power. Therefore, it is necessar%
to do away with that dolubt anid resort to congressional enactment
which would remove the hesitflancv.
Mr. MCCULLOCII. Do you thiik 'die congressional enactment, of
itself, would have much influence on lthe. Vice President acting?
Tite CHAIRMAN. I think it. would.
Mr. BROWNELL. That is where I disagree with the Chairman,
because I think it, is a constitutional problem rather than a statutory
problem.
The disagreement here is the interpretation'of the Constitution land,
while you feel one way,-I happeii to feel tie same way on it-suppose
t.ho whole committee or the whole Congress should feel hfe same waystill it. is a question of intepreting the Constitution, and there is Very
respected authorityv on'the other side, and I believe it is that very
disagreement which has caused the Vice President to hesitate'to act,
andithat is wvhy I favorMr. WALTEi. Is it. disagreement asmuch as it is doubt?
Mr. BRoWrNELL,. Doubt. I think that is more accurate. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRIMAN. Read tIle next sentence, and I think 'that nails it
d1own.
Xr,,.BROWNL,. I believe-and this is a personal opinion-that the
C(nftl,ijtiion now vests the power-The CHAIRMAN. Read the one before that. Yoti didn't read it.
Mr. BROWNE.LL. All right. As tile Congtittion now stands
TheoCHAIRMAN. -No. "Thus the Vice Preside'it is constituted"
Mr. BROWNELL. Oh, yes. I have it, now. I lost my place there
for a minute.
Thus the Vice President is constituted the judge of the President's
inabilitv.
As tie COnstitiitioit nlow stands, it. menftions only the successor,
and thus makes hin the judge of thie facts.
I believe the Constittition now vests the power of determining
inability ln the Vice President and that the Vice President could not
eonstltutonally be divested of this'power without a constitutional
amendment.
That is the argument on ty side only.
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I would point out hero-what I would like to do now is to showsthat if the President's I)lall, whieh involves 1)oth tile Vice President
and the Cabinet larticipating in this decision, shoul( be adopted, a
Constitutional ilnlen(lueet. would hae to be p',eel.
I call lo your attention the faet, thatl, th1 O)illet.
a
lhialways iotifie,d
lhe Vice President. when a President. has died. I fluink it, should also
,iotify him in an analogous sitluation of thfpresident's Iabilit,; lt
at the present, time that, is only custom that, requlies the C1alint. to
notify the Vice President. Ill ease of the President's deatl, and tlhe
iotification Adds nothing to the Vice lPresi(denlt's eing
jower.. In
other words, le succession clause, as it now stlds isse If-executing,
nd the Presideiitial poWeis devolve on the Vice President without
(his not iticatioi IIIder the Constitution1.
I think, as a pralical matter, that a Vice President wolll not
undertake the exercise of Presidentlal power during the perio(l of
Presidential inability without first CoIy'idth r the Cabinet; but.,
under the Constitulion, as I say, as it, is now, ie coul tlo so.
Section 3 of the proposal I ammaking this morning would make it
manlatory for the Vice President to Consult the Cabinet --a(ld to
secure the approval of a Majority of tIat body. III this sense our
proposal limits the authority wlieh the Constiiitut ion now vests in
the Vice President, aid that is the reason I think it is qite clear, nnd
I believe we would mil'agree that a consltitlitioll animel(ZI memit would be
necessary to cariryv it. into effect.
Mr. KI.ATIro.' Mr. Attorney General, before yoil proceed to No. 3,
would voit please turn back to your wording of the present Constitulion, on page 4 of your statement?
Mr. BRowE LL. Yes.
Mr. KEATIxo. There is a reference to what Congress nay by law
provide forMr. BitowsmLL. Yes.
Mr. KEATINo. And it stays:
* * * the Congres may by- law provide for the case of removal, Ideath,
resignation or Inabilitv, botli of the P1reAdent and Vice 'resident, declaring what
officer shall then actand so on.
Is it, your interpretation of that conistittloiii provision lhat the
etenx t to which Congress may by law provide for the inability has
relation only to declaring who shall act. in the line of successioni and
goes 10 further than that?
Mr. BowNPu,. That is correct.
Mr. KEAr No. SO that even though it says Congress may by law
provide for the inability
Mr. Brow%,F.Ll,. That is when 1)oth the Vice President and the
President are out.
Mr. KEATIXO. Oh, I see. That applies only in tho ease where they
are both out?
Mr. BROWxILLh. That, is corrvet.
Mr. KEATIX-o. All right.
Would you also, beforevoi proceeit to tho advocacy of your speefic
proposal, "comment at this t neik
0tthe suggestion mndo that (lie
Congress proceed not by a law, but, by a constitutional amendment?
Mr. Bnow-NELL. I would be glad to comment on that now because
it,seems to me the more you consider the situation the more you
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realize it is a constitutional debate that. is involved hero find that ,tho
statute would not settle the constitutiolinnl dlebtl.
iho aiilhorities that we have discussed here this morning, very
respeethble oil both sides, nrv talking about the interlrctation of the
resultt Constit utin, fln tliqncstiOn Would merely be-ul)pose the
statute were pagsed-whehieI the statute is constittionfli lider thtI.
same provision in the ConstitlUtion. So, you (o not, eliminate the
debate by passing the statute. You still hiive this conflict of opinion,
fnd the conflict of Opinion, I think history shows u1s1 is whal has
made tho Vieo President, so hesitant to act, to the point where fhil
Vice President just. 1ins
not noted oven thoul h yoll had a seriolls criss
of a year 111l ft half, as in the case of Preemiti-oni Wilson's illness.
M'. I{i:ATIN-. Counsel of our committee has calle'l my attention
to thhi teresting fact that in the first, 21 amendments to the Constitution they become effective infrom I to 4 years. 'he 22d took 4 years.
'Th fi-t 21 took less than 4 years.
I think you have made a very convincing argument for a constitutional amendilhnent.
-Mr. WAIN,.Irt. Actually, the average time is something less than
: years. You have to remember the --first 10 Amentnwts- were
adopted at, 1 time, but: the average time is something less than 3 years.
Mr.I itowNELL. It would seem now, if it is agreeable with you ,
Mr. Chairman, we might, discuss first why action is needed-I t hink
we fire in general agreement on thlat-and then discuss secondly why
the constitutional amendment seems to be. preferable to the statute,
and I bpieve-1 hope I am not overstating it when I say-there is
general agreement on that; but let us get to the specific provisions of
the planvwhich I would likd to have you consider, and I speak here on
behalf ofPresident Eisenhower, who has endorsed this plan and asked
the Congress to give it early and favorable consideration.
Section I of this plan merely confirms the present generally accepted
interpretation of the Constitution-that in case of removal of the
President from office, or is death or resignation, the Vice President
shall become President for the unexpired portion of the lhen current
term.
In other words this specifically affirms the result that has been
accepted by the Nation at least seven times in cases where the President has died. There is no controversy about that.
It seems wise to have it specifically stated in the Constitution rather
than a matter of usage.
Now we conie to tho questions of Presidential inability. There are
two kinds, you will remember, we are asking the subcommittee to
consider.
Section 2 states that if a Presidnt voluntarily declares in writing
that he Is unable to discharge the powers and duiies of his office, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
This section autthorizes tie President to announce his own inability
and allows him to do so, knowing that his powers and duties would
be restored to him when lie recovers.
The provision is also made that this announcement shall be in
writing for the obvious reason you don't want to have any dispute

fla to ifiether or not he (lid it., andf the existence of a written (locutnent
would serve that purpose.
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Tl'he CliiliM

. Suppose lie were a prisoner of war, oult. of lit,

'ollntry, an li he wouldil't bo able to write'?
Mr.- foI,%Iio tl,. Then I think he would have to coino under
wr
section
3; hut I tihtik it. is inOrlali in our thinking to ronieinllt
thatl limOst iOse$ w~'oid
uhllouibo dll"' l0 S
'olved
linder this -t4clion '2.
For eximliple, where tho lPixsidellt, i lie is going into 010 vio plhl 1iid

knows he is, going to hi out. in a fe(lN days, could mako- this writ-ten

statement, thlt would tikeeiro of it, alnd lie would know whon his
VOlhvlloswei'O wits Comilete lie cohtilOnie back il10 oflho, aiint lint
wouhl givo assurricenol ofilv to Iili, bot, to1hi public.
It would be at 0181y, sellsi)h' way of dealingg wilh Ithis prolemllli.
eliedlositolI
,Mr. Foiw Mr. Attorney (ene'l 1, what wold he
for thuit. statemnien?
Ni,,
r.i,,IliIow,
I lissulle uiiter lIhe exiting lnacticepit. would be
ldouiiielits
lie Offiho of the ,e'etll'y of Stalto, where aill suchi offit-Ihl
nre Iiled.
s action
As a mliattoi of fiet., the oily objection I have heard to ti.

No. 2 is t
kat,
it might. open fli' door to a President shrking his duies
and i 1)Olisibilitits; but. I lhik lte obvious answer to lhat. is anV
baking
President. who used this section to shirk his duties would le lle
hi oath of office.
Anid, of course, tnt. action would lie cOn'trariy to
Mi'. ICCUOVILOt.

all history.

h'lipro is not. (te slightest, bit of
Mr. lIowN,Eiu,. All history.
evidence that woiihl happell.
So I think we could pa!.over that. rather captious objection and
now to section 3, whieh is designed at least. to take eare of tIle
come.
niost. nUlUSuall sittt ioni which niiht.it, hia_pen, anid because it iiglt

!lppon, should be, 4lepalh with. -I his is thevose where the Presilent
is unibloe or unwilling to declare his own inability.
In other words, this is the section that wouldhbo applicable ii ease
the President. wero unconscious or, ill liot ase of the point raised by
ago, cahptured by lhe enemy in tite of war,
the chairman - litn.
something of that. sort.
You can't deseri e all the various Oveits that might, constitute
inabilit.y, but, ill these cases that w0 are talking abott, the plaln calls
for the (Cabinlet,
Vice President,
the approval of a majority of the Presi(dent's
to nmakewith
the decision.

SeBefore considering this provision, I tliik,
however, we should look
at-sone of the alternatives that, live beenl proposed.

Thilt CHAIRMAN. Mr. Attorney Oeniral, I think you nre very wise
in refraining from defining inabilityy."
II
. 'rhank you, sir.
Mr. Bitow
I think a close study of tho question would Iniike it quite clear in
a Constitution we sholdiln't, g") Into that, inueh detail.
Mr, WALT9Ii. I think ie word is delhied so well In all the courts
tiat, it, would serve to m1eet ally Sit u Ation,
Mr. IioWN:LL. Yes: I agre with Ihlit, Congressmnai,

Mr. KIi:.lN.

It is not a matter' of law.

Mr. Buow,:l,1 ,. That is riglt..
ourts,
ihis alternleati\'e
IetA's turn to a lplannlha
tilliivtlv6,
ptro posal, which wt reject, arose durin Oarfilohs illiess. Theodore
Dwiglht At that title Said that. tiePresidenlial inAllity wAs iftjudieial
courts.
question, and, therefore, should be detertnlied in the
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Now, in*
the past thea theory of justiciability, if you choose to call it
that., hais founild support among some Mei6bers of Congress,
For exali)lo, oit several occasions hills have becn Introdiced to give

the Nilreine Court. original jurisdletioi to determine the President's
inabilylt.v; Iut# of course, we start, with the proposition that a coustituti6na aliindmit would he necessary if this tv pe of solution were

to be adopted for these reasons, which I man sure wi[! he clearly
e vident
lo the members of this committee:

First, tohe Supreme Court. has already ruled that its original

jutrimdiclinl is lmiite(d to that set forth'in the Colstitution and
cannot be enlarged by statute;
Second, nto htlderAl coirt. can inqmnro, oil its own motion,
into tlie action of the le.Oh4lative or executive branches; and

Thir'd, it Is (llilitful' t-lit. the courts could be given statutory

nutho'iti; tofind a Presidont. -disabledin aniaction for inandalius,
diircct.ilng the Vice President. to act, as President, because the
discretionary authority is involved.
Mr. FoiLY. Mr. Attorn. (neral,
6
at,thatlpoint, are you acquaintied
with the recommendation of Professor Crosskey?
Mr. BIOWN.h,. Yes.
Mr. Fohrmv. Where lie suggested perhaps yol or your office might
initiate quo wari-aflto proceedings?

Mr. BfowNEJJJJ. I used to have a good many -arguments with
Professor Crosskev when he and I were members of the Yale Law

Roviow together, and I thilk I would colninue that. argument Oil
this subject. if I saw him again.
Now, then, to say that the courts (1o not -now have equity juris(ietltoll to pass on 4 Presidoit's alleged inability does not mea08n that

the court.44iight not pass on this quest ion, and here now we come to

Congressman Walter's inquiry. Once the Vice President, has exercised Presidenti al power, it,
is'
possible, I think, that the issue might.
be properly raised in a case involving individual rights.,
For example, ote who is prosecuted 'under- a law signed bIy an
Actlig Piesideit might. question (he validity of lie law on the ground
that. the President was not atualhv disablld and that. the purported
law, therefore, was hl)roperly signed.
To give youi another explpe, a litigant might attack the legality
of an mx-eutlve actlio6, alleging thai tie Presidhent was hicalpacitated
at. the time lie took the action.
in such cases, it i.4 concelvablo that the courts might, decide ti
(piestion of:, whether or not a President, is disabled.
I amin cined to think that., as the Constitution now stands, the
courts would (lehcle the Constitution submits this question to the
Vice President's judgueont, alone, and that they were houid by his
decision.
There vould also Ile the question of whether tile courts would look
beyond the prosumptlit of regularity of official action.
If this proposal subiiltted by me tlis m1orniihnlg were, adopted, I
believe tho courts would Atec pt the flidt
lhgoftie Vice Iresident., and
a major, y of the Cabilet, as final; ievwrtheless# I do think these
examples indicate that. the question night 6iisell ilhe courtsI and, as
1 said before, to siy tint, lie courts
towdoi'lt, have jurisdictioi to
piss on a Presideni's alleged inability isn't. to siy theyy couldn't. b
be
given it. by a coilsituioil amendietint..
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%Vp considered 11111t. possibility, of (Itwelopill t it

lfil

lindills whiell

tilt%, I Iresil I oll Vs 1111116111ty Would Ito dMill-Illitted Ply I llik vollr1q, and we
I'll p0t4l ic for thosix vilasons , 1hreo reasons:

ill 101011(tvil ill ItInkill I Ito original
Finat, kiliv coill-I ol. jild who 4111
1111(lill
to r411o (111 1 validi( y o f
led 1111oll
ho c 110,1611
parflos litigiflit.
1111glit
" lit it vasco ilivz4vilig
111111, , t#IWill
A svvoll( 1-ttli'loll is 01,14 wit hillievv 11111C Illiv provedlivo 01111 is
sh m I sl to IIII1 11INOvAblo ita-migh ( II 111mil fill- 4-0111 illgilliclem'- tilld
o.,I Ili 11-11

should Allow tho Viev ProAdOll (4) wistillitt, Prosidoill hil 11OW-61-8 pl-ollipt.- .1111d it 14vellied to Its v.4pt'vially
! v whiln, at I'l-esidmIC is dimbled
of mir

11111161,11ml In fillit, of 111111011111 elilergellev, whott"Illo
litlow, 1111 Ilot relidily 61111pit'd
Courts. whiell mv not, 111) to (IIAN., 11.4 %%'1,
liti(I'llexibility. ,
to Invot div.-w
There wits lilloilloir cow-toll wit%* Wt, 1110jeded 11411'.
Mr. Kvvrlml. Thill is. it lim"Aill'-phict" (if 1111di'l-AlilvillOilL

'1441 (III.Aglied.
Mr.
holievil thill. div Iiist
The othor I-i'llson \\.it Iviveted it. is lit'villise %%-Iimillilily is till extIVIIHNIP 111111tol. 111141 411olild I)v kv )I it)

(lie movildve bi'lilu'll of the (loverlillivilt, 111111 111lowilig thiv jit(livial
brallell ov, I might .411y. ovell 111v legislative livallell to 11111ke the initial
fill(lilig %%-ojlj(I \-joljjlj 11111 (lot'll-ilit%of -.41 1)11I'll I (I powt-IN., which i'l So
aild 111loWill f 01116111S
(111111111111111tal to -oul. conglitoliollill s -Slvlll.
011(sillo the exet'lifivit bl-411101 (4) itil-1101111tv ill (lit, iIli flilf-det-6ion
1)lvsidt lwy ittgelf.
Would bt, 'kill -011croad kiliell t. oil -

We volisidered
Am lilt' gi-millds.
StIvel-111 sliggest

of it spvchil

"overal othel. suggestioll't 1111d

llivill oil

rejeNed

eveMI611
whiell wolild bo vill-IfoWelled , to oifillov

!oils, for ilislallev, lilwv beell Offil-NA-fol"I Ile

'i'llPi'l I Ill
plivsivialls lilld requirki tho 111-tsidoill to sublilic to jill 18101 11111(l
11111joriCy
it
by
)il'I(Y
hill
lilt
of
exislelleo
(lit,
1111tv
,
(AX;i1ilitlatiollst, alld ditt.
or

two-Illirils,

wo
1

coll'sidol-od

Vote,

of
theso,

01111,
bill

commission.
we

rititteled

thrill

for

a

of

null'il)(NI.

vollsolls.

would likol to M1141,

Find, k seemed illmim, to Ils to I'Mablisli fol-11 IWl"legill l1wellillevy
it 111-tvWelit, Ilivskill 114id Illmifill vX11101fationg beclulso Oll'S
fol 94101lig
,
6 it ) -o
Ills
11111olilits to- placing
(111

trijjl

Its

10

111ix Would g1vo a 110,1111v

o-0111111W4101i 010 11OW(T 10 11111-11R$ 111111 11(
and
coil) 1116'.41011 acted ri'likollabiv ill Ow 11111(ter.
Evoll ifthe
till timm.
which wo might. presume, (here is dw danger of

that, tilt' volillilis,4ioll act 1111d OIRC Illollo wollid- bv ( ellivallilig to (he
President-'s office, --corlainlv so fnr n,.q world -6pinion ivivA concernod- eo that. not only would pro;visioll for suell physielli and 111011411 OX41111inations Ili,%lilt WrolA to-Ow Presitivia's ptins6al dignity, but. I OiNk
it, would degrade tho Prowsidenfint ollivo itself.
Sevolldiv, wc, I-Opeted these pIRII-A h(VAllso it SC(Illis
t-stabl'U411 it complivateil procediliv Which woll-ld provela

Immediate

ac-tioll ill thilp ot pill ergellev. The great. Ileed is for volitillultv ill div
exercis-p-of oxeOllivv power'Of leadonslill) ill thile of crisis, and ilNestigntiolls alld hearillp alld fludillp filld votes of it commission, 1 11111
afraid, could dr-ng oil for daYtt, or ()Veil we(+S, tjlld I-it.41111--fil A gff(11-11menini crisis, during Which Ito ollol wolild havo tho Clear III-F1111 to

exercise preAdontial power.

Moreover, wo boliove that allell - 1101,114,

with newspaper accounts of conflic(hig W.4tiniony of physiviatis alid
others hef6re the Commission, wpuld servo to diWde Public 614111011,

i11WHM!DKN'r1A1
dlivide
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lh
n
tho voi)1111113, v'awI it 1111h

aIil liglit ha~ve serious11
AiI111~

le' l)PONAIIres Shiould h)o fle'xible, Anld tley sholild
So I blieive IIII (tI
he pr-ohptAn11111 it eabrv~ f100i
liuihiiwery 11id ltailed proeedures
111l1
it( liuiv'ilOw 01)losiO OLr(e
t-h Itot 0t Ill(%polite, I be1Ieo'e -aiu t hei plati that I present, Ihi,
tv paropeiIorliliug oil behal11'f of (Ilie l'resleViil s .-t ut t(lie (~u'netr1 fs
lliofdy to 1111 itlo, 11l61g wih'v -lit Viev l'iresident , inl deehiring ai
Presidetilillh.
aiabilt.''i
The ilmt. lift or ll -is till pe('i ke 1h.
olinl fal -i-lly-. A dvek~ln 4,4-111is blody allong
I I. ik Ou
he Plulent.'sl
'i't
Presoidl(t iq lik~el, to rvveee'iti1AIht a-eefthlue-*1at tlat
witi (If %li
('eituuily ohi the'-pil -I.tOf Iiunklig Riidor t h11I. if tisi groupj neted,- there
the
wVout~l f ito, (ItI('5t ioul of (l i' ' hI'idllf ii1i4111il wpowe(m]0
111 mht
ioi('4)v'e, till%( Cahlel N1H
ri t: IIAro onl Olw
hli-V OXI, of 11,
job iirild ill a positions to kuuow~ IIt olive whet her t ho )lresidvIII ik ale
to tiet..

Tlhie ( 1 imm~~N, We I-eeiv('( aIiunher of replies to 0our (jtetiohium1ir~e..
)f till ,r,,
li'vplies revviv'ed,- I ibbik iotie of tiem involved Ihe

silelt in or i Preasidpiu's ( abiiet aq I lie detninhig ageltcyee
%oVe
ilt) 1118410 thait, suiggt-Stitl, b~ill 1V
t hat (If fotlulit' IlP141(kitI
wag. (1he 0ily 0110 who ofire(d tha su40tiIohi.
Am- y'ou ('xIoultiliiig-former 1'u'esidpii( I loove-i-'s- rot her I hall Prues,i-

I think iI)steit.Ahove jlt I aIS 1 recall, waS
Mr' ~o':i.
for the ('ahiirt alone, which I votild like to ('rnplnl-ize tu isii plan
(hot's itot. proose, althlouigh l tht' havie lti'eii, s01me1 p)r('s.' repjoi to thell
)111('011 1iie (1lie (le('isdit in the Vive Pmremle ., where I
'1h~s
It, onlly says 1ha1t., ilt doing so, Ile would (to w~tlit
Ie( ordlllarily woild~ do, 1 11n1SUre, Iluther thle c'irculist Alces, but it
makes It. a re4 uir-enuentll (lint, hto co-iisIIi Ihlie ('1obiin't anld obtaiii tile
al-~Ovial Ill wi-l tliig of (ilie llijoity.
86o, ill other' words5, w'liuit I 11111,j)reaSeuitig to youl 11111' Riot, be ft(i
acorhiug to tile aiiswers to your Iftuestioniuuires,
(jIlaititat ive S011111 fion

behiteve it. should be.

bilt I beIlieve oll quality it ik(he hewat.
I thilik afstudy of the' (lafleld'anfjd Wilison cases lidientes that.
t,_e
e voin answer to tis: NiemTh'ie ( ~iA
. I WOIl(l jii5t* lik
by (lie, Pesident., of course.
hers of (lie Vaiiniiet. oire am~~ii~
Mr. BhbowsraM. With the advice hu1( consentt of flie Sente.
Tlhe OfA1:0M~AN. Yes. Bitt(hey are apipoinited 1)y (lie President.
'rhtly~ couildiit. get, 111lindvice and"Conlsentl of (ile Sienae 1unless they
Were liploinit '(I

iy (lie PresidhenL
D~on I. they owe it loyalty, atplWsonatl loyalty, to (ile Plresient?
Mr. IIIioNvE.!.. Of'Colsq, everybody Who hans office takes hlis ot~h
of o11100 t hat, Ile will fait hfnl' Jprorm thle (hide' of hlis office under
(ile Colnstlit ion, so0 that. their greatest and( highest, loyalty is to tlie
I think it. is Itio l theyio are ordinarily personal friends of (lie
'1'Iev are certainly hIk oficin'! 61111ly, and inclined to be
Prldie.
loyal to him, finu( lnt, is til additional reason %Aiywe think it would
1)0 advisablie tW lit~o -themn consulted b~ecauseR, after till, puiblio opinion
is going to dedeo whether or not, this should be (lone, and the firat.
thin g anybody inl this country is goi rg to %%ant(to know Is that the
lPres'ldont,'s friends, at, least., i feiunable to s-poak for himself, are

tlioie rtlly vonivinlcod tha 1ti8, Isa wigo move; Iothli~sI, Y~ou would
dI vision nd chaost il Owtt
votflft.
So, (lint ia onto i'iispil wo thiik that. is amn sset, to tlina nrtlctilnr
l1111-01Mt here would ho it aroop'Opeiikiig whod would [it considered
if voil Nvill; as itritsfl of'tlie 1Pres(it iiild after tliti hatve llblernat PI
on it- IHII tholight it wasI O(hio IL't11Vi to do, )(IOII111 itilit,
policy
stalidpolit, it wold hllve, I bldiove-tio (Ittl Iit oh lOid linve- rent.
have

I)ubhl i jepihtie W1110h, of Cillil-$, Is egsetlafl to (lie Siess o th

Th'le (The~MN%''iei
loynfty mt voroi0t1i ft'iitgs to) tlile ( t ia
killlit Cause themllto lid, tilt%other way.
liii uk

we had dith ande cleatr,3.llyitutet fiiitil, ease of 1te Wilsoit

clibilot.
hey ilisL'd to-Celt10 to AM,3 siiehI- - Air.
u.O~IW1
~It tho rnson tfhey did t hat, I believe, All%
r
2hniiltm, %V11 qfl1ite ekitily
blilshit' they, weve tileititii RR to
wholei Ow
(lie ltir'll~
boti
ack it office, ilt thle c'11( of Is
disaitility, mid that. Is thle rolaseit tihl. phtin ti'removes that olinve
nitil Says tight, t tilt%Wgiliiig, before (lte thig litiltitetis, the tnhiii'w
the I'resident i%nblo to net again, he, comc.es biwk.
With that kid iof si1ttitioni Ift SA'CiltH (1111(p IOkni to Mue 1110i'0 wollil
ho p110 htdio, 1 V'iet Pridokt. or 1lie Cablttet itutking thsdecisloit,
Antd thoe Ctht b1)clit'i thellr fliidliue theyim were (lig_ it, otilv
foIeteiom 101*
elout 011d tat 016
th,
ill of the people flint Wle
11tv,411mituti
t100,
(1
0
Sholild aret votildh bl efrei' latedh.
'rhe (CutintN. 1111111 nature11
HAWNnn
bt
wind it is, first Volt have
loyalty to theo ("llief, atil sicondly, wit ci k very jut polani , thiev
111111, OJISUC loa of jobs- heads m11ay 1). OliOpped 41T if filie I'esideut
eotles h111k; they maitty I10 longer. he t11iteittite of (lt" Ciabilet-iuhd I

think dlia is nimitportant foctor to be coitsidered.
Mr. Buovxmi 1 . Asstiming O Vice Presidenlt neted aibit tidily.
Yon would have svverAl---rThe ('111itwx. I have nol roferencev, of
to1,1
prse1.nttbr
ille
of tlie wresentf ('ihilt.
Mr. I111oNt't. NO. No proseiit, perslolnitis Should lip cohisi((ep('1
ill mcoetionl with thlis wltoi (Jll0$timi; biat if flint should(hitllponui,3
NVAIuid have (Ito safeguiardI righ t narticle N, thant tOw Progidetit, if
lie was there, eould act, 111ud co~llie, back byn' a wilt(en devinriitioi, mid1(
you would hafve, of Collr1se, tie tlill1at
letCtioit of (lie imetiieiihtitetit l~'Cdt~,
wh iouldl 1) applIvable, lit cage (lieA('tig i'reslileit
WAtS acting aiim~rily.
'rte (Cauniumv. TIhat 6. where yeu cover it?
Mr. I11owvxFni,. YCA.
'rho%Ca u,%x lutf Ieo doesmi't recover, its ink (li ease of Ga1101eld,
thieo would no longer he members of time%Cabliaet.-aid it, Lisanice,

TPhe cikim" iknd they would resolve Any doeubhts they hand inl
fitvor of thefr Chief, I woulA think, Let's be practical aboot. it.
Mr. Bitow~xvm,. -Oki ai hilportry bagis, I. believe- that, would be a
groutdlo," fear, Mr. Chnirmani.
I
Mr. M cwam.om. M\r. Chairman; I share somno of your fearg in t his
field, and I think thint isoeof tlie major decisions thud tl04. committee,
muaL first, r~olve.
I tlhik the exipereico of Scecary Lasig is otne (lint must, giv'e
anyone pause, i'egfrdless, of section 4.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Mr. lhRoWNiIMd,. 'I'lea I evideItly
Veiio't gotten Iim oilt, across,
becalise ily poiltt Is that history illhcates, to me at least, (Itltclearly
that tie rasol for 11tis stalealite, for thie failure to act, was becaUse
of the Iliicertniity a to whlehew the PrOie(lelnt couh ever come hack.
If Iam correct in that and we diniige lIthConislitiltio ihi the mlaniter I piOjiS(e, Vou would eliininte tlin. obstHe'l('entirely, nid you

wouhli hove thin n(tling only for tihe duratioti of the iinbillity.

Mr. Ki,:yrli, \[Ir. Altoriily Geiieral,lIo dhirionli, with whoin I
must. sany Inst. venr 1 wan rtst hfer iiliued to be ill agrevI61t., would
leave it.' entirelv to the Vii'e Preshleiit to iiihk( this (etriluhintion.
O1w reason for ilty relctance to rccelpt, that ih thl 1 ('l ii see a danger
there hecalsoe o provide for he president rn,,slmiing his I'residenoy,
if Ile Ii abl to do so, till (lt69r (of a chaotic (olidifiIon by having tie
Vice I'reAhleli. say lI Presie lit. wfas 1znbh, ald the iiext. (lay the
l'r4idetit sayilig, ' ant able" and th-enl (lie Vice President. the next.
day saying ie is amiable, so that you would hnve a (lny-Iy-lday 1resi(kilt..

Now, to a lesser degree, it strikes nIh(lat, daigr is iulerent in this
proposal whiclr-leaves it. to tho Vice -Presilent aid Clahinet. If the
Vie I'cresithnt and the Cnlhaiiet de(idet to gahig uI) oi the President,
they might say, "lie is iiiiable,"1 nil~f1ien the next (lay, under your
-proposal, icic'ild-sny, "1-am able to nel.," and unless he fired-the
]illilers of tlie Cbiiel., Ihey Would then the next, (lay say lie was
tillble.
Thali
gs been oiie reason wily I have leaned toward the feeling that.
it. would be hel ttr to liav o' the Cnbiet share int lie d,eison, but not
to have it. nbsoltelv conclusive, but. to allow the other branches of
the (overnnont, to have a voice il reaching thnt. decision.
Would you coinzlent oil int.?
Is that. a fear which you doi't thiik is serious- that there coul he

a chin6tic situation reslillnu from lils plan?

M1r. fluownsI,. I wouh be ilieid to think it would 1e almost.
nonexistett., for t his reason: Tlat. plublle opinoim is going to decide
this Iiatter in he tlltinate analysis.
No Vice 1Presidpiit canil mtke thi decision unless lie feels that the
country is with him, Conlreas is with hii, nid that public opinion is
wilh hn. If lie does soe de.,rovs himself forever. As a matter of
ftl, even if lie makes a mistake it; hindsight, lie is des roved forever.
So 1.his decision is going to be very deliberately made, nlid it is going
(I) be uitnde wi lh the alvice of the*Pregident's official family so that
it will be a serious decision, ad I wouldthink tle Vice 'resident,
realizing th at., the Constitu1ioii says-andl lie takes his oath of office
to support the Consttilotn--he i1s
ouly il there oilai acting basis.
for itteiiporary period, oven afer lie'got in, would act wisely and

with duo regiln1'd to that.; otherwise, iewould destroy himself i tie

field of public opinion id his whole life, official life,'woldd certainly
bte Qopardized, if not. destroyed.
' q is a very powerful ftel or, perhaps the most powerful of all the.
factors th, tcoine into play here.
Mr. WALTR:. Mr. Ilrowelcll, have you given any thought to the
uIdvlsbilitv of having th1e President, when lie feels'he is able to act
agilin, subilit his case to-the Cabinet?

.\Ir1. BtowNE;..

We have, to answer your question directly, yes,

giVen COiisideratio1 to that.

We had Adi'se1Sioui of thll , and \

felt
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that.

(hgaile about
flli' jeopl Of (1i0 counftry~ would tint., feel 'q0iit e00
(liePr~hlent-oining bhn 1 thy dto Ilhouit.- tito' l'id~eilt. gouligj ou4t..
'lhov eh'etedl (lIe- Presidlent, of(Pr till. IlThey want. him Iii there. Theyo3
IIV1 vif ngltor tr'Ist Iitit to make this decision. So As for as hlis comling
back [11to olileo is vouerned, wo fell. there should be' n0 iitrings onl it,
11fl;(llt(i I.%Whitt tile people voted for, And (tillC is what, they wanlt.
TIat. 01idv leaves ( (Ittit'Ilti, ais I see Vt, of tile extrolite shitftion
whieroit 11resioientl Obvioulsh till-Able to lOet., st-ill (ktelmiflhI&I'( to do0 so,
And iii lai'Cekless si fitio ol flint, kiindt, or one wvhei'e hw retilly wais not
lible to make atrationald (levsion, if (lie' flime or criss wiv; such alint.
action NvWas Ieeoded, yOll v('(101hiiig ill yourI,"
ili
helI t I)roveediiig,
Mr. WmiTH-i(. There is (Ilet (ii er case where thle Acting Presidel.
WOU'ilo 0011010 lid(hid e wats going to renlinin .-

hMr. l1iOWvt'iir. YeS.
Mrt' WmaLrm:. And wotld refuse to ae~lt til' Nresdtilt 's repre.sV'ntatmonl lie isg Itow%%
IIIe to rry oil.
M~r.-BhtOWN.imi,. T1'011 (fillt. IR ano11ther reason1 why rou waint the1
Presidoiolouto to W)1Ale to iiiko the deIllttr1tiolii under Seet ion ..
Mr. Fx.itlnAx. Mrt. CJhairman?

Mr. Fl"tAN. lDO YOU not feel (lint. if tile President. oheltirel Ilia
inability an1id tulbsequeitly felt, Ine Was abde, lit' probably. w6ould be ill
veryN secude
I
ircunuStne? lit that vase, I wonder hti sIibk
~trmitted(0t fuituetion.
opiitionl of which youl speaik mvoilid-1 pe
Mr. I~o~a.Of course, this would all be a mtter of public
record, And perhaps .lie attetition of tite entire Nation wouldoh of
col.,irse, be focused ont it-, so' tha1t, I (Iin'Lthink Ainy Aspect of it votild
)0 niot, inl full publi, 'view if -1un4derstland Your questions.
(fIke,
most. likely, secluded sitntioti
Mr. F10won1A. I ant tlhnking
inl which tile P~resident would findv1iinseif.
Mr. Bl1owNmu. Yes.
Mr. Th~rntA N. TPhere may he some mini
degree: of 110,pit~hi'Aalion -perhiaps.

?dir. ffitow :Pi,. JIMs. place it, lit theo context of present.-day life,
whorm you have tYour television Andl your press con (erences and fill,
so- (Il~t, it wouIA bo very long, if ny mistake was inade, before tho
p~eop~le would' find out, abut it, And( atitoit would be forced]. Now,
.someo askod me, Mr. Chimimnl'rho'CAIMN Mr. Attorney Getieral, thlia committee hing a bill
whieh is going to ho considered very shortly. So we wvill Ask you to
concluded as soon As lpossihh'.
Mr. B1uowNvo~u,, 1 ould finish lit 6 miute,if.yon vielt.
Someone asked melt thn question of how this would work,IWho Would
initiated tile Action, whether it. would Ile thle V'ice President or thle
Cabinet. I would like to comment onl that.
Whe
c
'Phe CAinet., under Onte sot of ci rcu istanctes, Could nlot ifv
President when a majority of that, body believed that thie Pr-esiden t's
inability was sufficient, to w~t'at. aiidevohlition of thle Presideittiatl
power on tlhe Vice Presidnt.
Tlhorm is an analogy there. The dabimiet has tilways notified the
Vice President when a President hans (lied, and spetiOn would extend
this custom in thle) case of inability.
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On the other hand, the Vice President. could make the decision to
assume Presidential power, but the constitutional validity of his

decision Would depend Ii-pon the Cabinet,'s approving that decision.
So, it. coll b|e initiated either Way.,
'l'here is also tho jpossililit, that uitnder section 3, th6 Vice Presidont
could take tie lliativo witIoiti the Cabinet, first inviting 1dI_ to

make the decision. Inlike the present provision of the Constitution
howve\'r, this plan, section 3, would require approval of a majority of

the Cabinet, before the Vice Presidellt could undertake tie exercise of
P['sideilal power.
Now, section :3 contains a safeguard against, flie Vice President's
Visible usurpation of power oin a pretext, of inability. A Vice
resident who undtakes (le exercise 1 in other words, of this Pre-sidential power, would be assured that his action could not be seriously
branded as usurpati6if, because it. would b approved hI advance by
a majority of the President's own appointees in (te Cabinet.
In ddhtion to the safeguard-provilded by section 3, as one of youc
brought out a momefit ago, section 4 contains a second safeguard becaiuse' it. jwoi'ides tha.i Whenever the President declares in writing that
his iinbility is terminated, the President shaill inninedintely resune
the exercise of the powers and duties of his office.
So, I think section 4 provides a disabled President with a constitutionial gunranty that the disabled President can regain the powers of
his office without. tlie conerrence of any other official or any other
group; but. luore iiil)ortant than nn thliig else is the point that I conclude with. which I mentioned a moment ago to Congressman Kenting: NMloreimlportant, than' any of the written safeguards areo those
provided by our political processes, for ultimately the operation of
any constitutional arrangement, depends on public'opnion, (If upon
(li public's processing a certain sense of constititional morality.
In the absence{ of tis sense of constitutional morality on the part
of tlicitizenry, there can )e, of course, 110 ularanti against the
words, no mecianusurpation of power or an' cop 4detat.. II Iot
ical or procedural soltitn wi h provide a complete answer, if one
iaS.Hiincs Iypotlietical cases in which most of the parties are rogues
propriety exists.
an( in which no sense of constitutionalprovision
?or 7 years for ratifsection 5 is merely (ie mechanical
cation by the States.
I would conclude my remarks this morning both by thanking the
chairman and the inembters of this subcommittee for their courteous
attention, and expressing my firm belief that the plan presented to
you has the essential ingredients to make anydeeibion under it a just
one, and generally lcceptable to ou people, for history and commonsense combine to tell usiht this problem should be solved to protect
our Nation in time of ftuttre crisis.
Mr. K ATIN0. Mr. Cliairman, may I make this comment: I have,
as the Attorney Oeneral kinows, offered a legislative suggestion, which
is now 11. R. 6510, calling for a Presidentlt*ldinability Comnssion to
make tlie determination of inability,. I have been very much inipressed with the arguments advanced by the Attornoy General on
behalf of himself and the P'esident., and uiiy mind is very open on (lie
I f
way wo slhould approach thia problem.
M ,one decision is that it should be approached. I feel the commission plan is the best approach still, but I would be very much
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inclined to prefer, iltle absiseceof any suggest ion at, nil, the stiggestion made by the Attorney G0eneral or, hideed, the suggestion made,
by the chnirman or any other of i reasonable nature to solve this

problem.
In order that the Attoney Goneral's views of the Presideutt"s
proposal may be before us in tangibleform, I should be Iapt", to also
offer in the liouse the proposal niade now by the Attorney Gcoral.
Mr. ll1,foWN I.,. Thank you veryimuelh.
'he CilAtRSIAN. I think we will hve committee prints embodyitig
all I)roposals that have beell suggested.

I want to say we are very grateful to you, Mr. Attorney General,
and Mr. lRogers. Your presentation has'been very enlightenitig and
very helpfulio this -omiffiiiee. It has been, I woUild say, on a very
Thith plane, AiMit.i has been exceedingly constructive, and, I am sure.
trill help the mellers come to some conelusion.
I fim inl my study of tile matter there is' perfect answer to this,
that ever' answer lias iiperfeetlbns, and what we must try to do
is to readi the least objectionable solution.
Mr. KT'rlNo. I want to add somelthig else, Mr. Chairman.
T10oCHAIRMAN. Let me say first, before I forget it. I want to put
ii-tie record lhe statemeii f -the coliimittee on1 the ederal Coisti-

tution of the New York StateBar Associatioi on this matter, and ani
editorial that appeared inthe Washington Post this morning entitled
"Displacing Ill Presidents."
(Tho'linatter referred to was ordered to be printed in time record, as

follows:)

NVW YORK 81'AT, lIAR AS.OeIATIt)V,
COMMITrFN ON FoI;MMIAI CONSTITUTION,195i.

March 2,9,

lo1.

,MANUM1, CEIVI,

Committee on the J udiciary,
1ous of Representalirts, Washington, D. C.
lI)AR MR.CIm, Fit: As yoti know, 'the committee on the Pederid Cotistitution
of the 'New York State Bar Amoclatton has sttdied the quetloti of Presidential
inability for some months and hits given consideratlon to the many suggestions
made to the Judiclary ubconiitteo oilthe Subject.
As a result it is felt by this colilttee that a collsittionai niadnient is

ilecetsarv, and that tht amendment should providee itstibstatice:

(oh That the eommenctment and termination of any Inability should Ixdetermined by such inviliod asr0og ess hod! by law ' 1rovldo; mid
(b)l In ease of the hiability of the Presidont, thai the %Ice President should
scceed olyt to he Iperts aiid duties of the office mid ilbt to the office Itself.
It Wseleat thai I. its presemit form the fifth lase of section
1 of article II of Ihe
Constitution leaves olxmi the matter of determination of what constitutes inability
and fails to authorro anyone to deal either with the beginning or the el of thle
disability. This fact has Ien a matter of embarrassmellt to the governmentt, it
the past and could be a matter of natiofiil ill-&aster in Ithe future.
The question 6f what happens on the death of aPresdent and whether the Vice
President then succeeds to the office or succeeds only to t1to powers and duties of
the office has been settled hv historical tradition. As we all know the Vice President is sworn in as Pr,-.ident upon the death of the latter. Presumably the smie
thing would happen
case of the resignation of tile President or of his removal
from office.

On the other hand, it Is not clear whether in case of Presidential inability the
Vice President. would become President or would only be anthorized to act as
President as one succot.'ding to the' powers Vnd (lutlesof tho oiflle. Tile words
"the imme"
have iiever beMn contrued i this colnectlioi and this fact adds to
the coifuslon which is so apparent in the recent discusslots on the subject.
It is extremely douibifl whether Congress has Imwer to (Ial wi the matter
without a constitutional amendment and clearly the ambiguity of tie present
provisions camot Ix cured by act of Conress alone.
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Our committee concludes that n constitutional amendtnent Is necessary for
any final or attthoritativ0 solution of the problem and therefore recommends for
your consideration that the fifth clause of section I of article II of the Constitu.
lion should be amended to read as follows:
"In Case of the iehmoval of the Presldentfrom Office, or of hils Death or Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President. In Case of the Inability of the President to discharge the Powers and Duties of the ld Ofice, the
said Powers and Diuties shall devolve on the Vice President, until the Disability
be removed, The Congress miay by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation 0r Inability, both ofMthe Presidenti atd Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then be Prsldent, or in Case of Inability net as President. and Such
Officer shall be or act as Presidcint accordingly, until h President shall U, elected,
or, in Case of Inability, until the Disability shall' lx! earlier removed. The
commencement and termination of any Inability shall be determined by such
"
method as Congress shMI by law provide."
If this amendnient shall be adopted it would mean that incase of the death,
resignAtion, or removal frnm office of the President., tie Vice President would be
sworn li as President. In cas of the President's Inability, however, the Vice
President would only net as President, having his powers and duties, until the
isability- waaremved. Congress would be called upon to enact legislation
deternini'g the method by which the commencement and termination of any
inability should be detertimbned,
lit view of the antint of time that would necessarily pass before adoption of the
amendment there would be plenty of time for your committee to consider what
method should be adopted by Coiigress. for this determination.
. In cae.of the hiblity of both the President and Vice-President the change
contained in the amendment proposed above is designed to make it plain that
tie officer who shall then act as President shall do so on a temporary basis until
the dlsabilit" is removed or a President elected.
It is believed that. no amendment iwA-ld be suffiielt to meet the problem without providing+for the determination of the question of commencement and termination of Iniability of tile
President. or the Vice President, or without separating
the provisions relating to inablilty front those relating to death, resignation, or
retovnl,'thus removing the ambiguity Involved in the present language,
I sincerely hope that the foregoing will be of assistance to you and your coinmittee In your consideration of his vital subject, and I atn enclosing additional
copies of this letter for the other members of the subcommittee, and am sending
further copies to the committee's general counsel.
Respectfully and sincerely yours,
CORNELIUS V.
JIIOKERSIIA,
Chairman.
iFrom the Washington Post, April 1,19571
DISPLACINO ILL PRESIDENTS
Beverly Smith, Jr,, Washington editor of the Saturday Evening Post, takes us
to task- in a letter published on this pago today for casting doubt on the effieacy
of his proposed Presidential Powers Cmmnismlon. In his recent article In that
magazine, Mr. Smith offered his plan tinder tile title of "Smith's Two Cents
Worth."
But now he ha. substantially raised his price and urges its acceptance
Msa means of plucking the flower of national safety out of the nettle of danger.
We fail to see any such promilo lit
the proposed Presidential Powers Commission.
That body-somewhat similar to the Presidential Inability Commnqlon in Repre.entative Keating's bill-would be composed of three members of the Supreme
Court, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, the majority and minority leaders of
the Senate, and the Speaker and minority leader of the lious.
Any time it might
find the President temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office it could install the Vice President as acting Presi'dent. W hen and if the
commisWion should find the President's disability removed, it could restore his
powers to him.
In displacing the President the commission would have to act by. a two-thirds
vote. WoUld it also take two-thirds of tile commission to restore the President
to his office? If so, 4 of the 0 members all of whom might be of the opposite
political party, could prevent a recovered President from regaining the otilee to
which the people had elected him.
Other grave questions must he asked about the proposed PPC. For instance,
would the Cihai nian, who would be the Chief Justice, be the only person who
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could call it In session in case of a presidential Illness? Any Chief Justice would
be most reluctant to intervene in the affairs of the President. Mr. Snitb seems
to assume that such a C6mmission would have relieved President Wilson of his
duties and powers during his illness. We seriously doubt that Chief Jistice
White would have Initiated such a course of action, and if a Commission had
attempted 16Aisplace Wilsoi in the tense atmosphere of the fight over the League
of Nations he would certainly have resisted with all his power. An appalling
fight over the Presidency might have been the result.
In our opinion, the best prospect of relieving the Nation's plight in that situation would have ben a clearly established rule that the Vice President could
fill in temporarily without acceding to the presidential office. Mr. Smith may
be right in assuming that Wilson would not have invited the Vice President to
take over In any event, but there is even less probability that he would have
bowed to a Commission s edict without a potentially perilous struggle.
The existence of such a Commission would be a constant source of Irritation
to any PreSident. Every time a Democratie President might be temporarily
ill or might haVe to undetko an operation, a Republican Speaker or leader in the
Senate could badger the Chief Justice about summoning the Presidential Powers
Commission. The Chief Justice would be accused of acting or (ailing to act out
of partisan motives. One of the most serious objections to the whole scheme is
that it would plunge the Supreme Court into political imbroglios.
In sum, the proposed PPC would raise more doubt and uncertainty that it
would remove about national leadership in case of disability on the part of the
President. For that reason it. is dangerous.
A much safer proposal on this
subject is the one favored by President Eisenhower-which would permit the
Vice President to act as a substitute for the President at the latter's request.
We are glad to note that Mr. Smith also favors this plah even though he thinks
it does not go far enough. Mr. Eisenhower's additional plan of having the Cabinet decide the disability issue when the President himself could not Is provoking
about as much controversy as the Commission idea has done.

Mr. KATIiNO. Irmight say, parenthetically, I understand that this
committee of the New York State Bar Association doesn't agreo with
anybody on this problem, which is par for this course; but I do want
to add 'this, Mr. Attorney General, and this is an encomitiu of the
chairman; in light of this statement that this has been held on such
a high level; I want to call your attention to the fact that this committee sat. and heard a large volume of evidence on this subject last,
year, toward the end of the session, and the chairman agreed with

those of us on our side that, iv was an inappropriate and Indelicate

time to bring up that. subjeotathat timn,a1( any political advantage

which he or his party might have derived from it was completely
divorced from his mind, alid we agreed together that we would take
it up in a very serious way in this session.
I want to say I commend the chairman most highly for that
attitude.
Mr. BROWNHLi,. I would like to add my appreciation to that.
Mr. WALMER. I think this indicates the quandry of the members of
this subcommittee, because we have been wrestling with this thing
since 1955, and I think all of us have tho same views that we had when
we initially undertook a solution.
Mr. BnoWNELL. It is a hard problem, but this subcommittee can
handle' it., I am sure.
Tho ChAIRMAN. Have you seen this brochure the committee isued
on the Presidential (i|sabilitv?
Mr. BROWNELL. We have. We just received one this mnornimtg,
Mr. Ciairmnn.
Mr. BRooKs. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BrooKs. Mr. Attorney General, on page 21 of your testimony
you indicated that you beloved thpt to allow the jlidicial or legis-
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lative officers to make the initial determination would be violative
of the, Constitufion, or would not be, constitutional. ,Do you thilik

that is true ii light of your restatement on pago 12 of iho second part
of paragraph 6, where it states very clearly in the Constitution that
"the Congress may by law provide for the case of-removal, death,
resignation, or inability, both of the President ai(d Vice'President"?

Mr. BnOWNE'LL. I have twO comments on that. lFirst, that point

that you just mltioned, that is a case specifically where
lthe Constitution says in case both th P'resident and the Vice President are out,
there cat be a succession law by statute.
The question we are raising is on the first part of thf't scction
which does not m intion Congress acting, but I do not intend to say

the Constitution could not be amended to provide that type.of

situation where. Congress or the judiciary might participate in this

decision.
Of course, you could have a constitutional amendment, but my
point there was rather to the policy involved.

We have always endeavored to maintain this strict separation -of
powers between the three branches, and this seems to be peculiarly
an executive-branch decision.

Mr. BROOKS. Then'you don't think it would actually be unconstitutional for congressional officers to participate in such a decision?

Mr. BROWNELL. I think the Constitution could be amended to pro-

vide that.

Tio CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Thauk you, Mir. Attorney General.

(Wherehpon" at 11:48 a. i., thblhearing was adjourned, subject to
call of the Chair.)
(The following was later submitted for the record:)
COMMITTEE ON TilE JUDICIARY, lIousE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

On April 1, 1957, a statement-.on Presidential inability was presented to your

subcommittee by the Attorney General. Shortly before that the committee on
Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar Association presented to your
subcommittee a suggested amendment deal ng with that problem. It did'not thet
have before it the recommendations of the Attorney General. However it agrees
with fim that in removal, death and resignation the office devolves bt4 that in the
case of l6bility the duties and not the offle6 doolve upon the Vice President, that
such Inability may be terminated, resulting in the President taking up his duties.

It agrees that a constitutional amendment Is the best solution. It Is true that bv
usage in those cases where it was impossible for the President to return, the Vice
President has taken the oath of office, although there is no specific constituiqgnI
sanction therefor. A constitutional amendment would forever remove do ut asto
this. Such diverse views have been expressed on the question of whether Congress
has the power-to legislate on Inability that it may be contemplated that if such
power were exercised by virtue of an act of Congress without constitutional
sanction it would be tested In the courts. For those reasons the committee has
advocated constitutional amendment.
Our subcommittee on Presidential inability, of which I am the chairman, and
Messrs. Elihu Root, Jr., and Arthur H. Dean are the other members, have not met
since the statement of the Attorney General so there has been time for informal
discussions only. Hence this memorandum Is submitted as an expression of my
own views although in general concurred In by the others.
While the Attorney tCeneral advocates constitutional amendment, he does to
on a completely different ground. His expressed view is that the Vice President
could not be divested, without cons(itutIonal amendment, of the power of determination which he now has. The reason for divesting him of that power is that
he should be given a more limited power to declare inability and then oldy with
the consent of a majority of the cabinet who are executive 6fficers. ThigInemorandun is not primarily concerned with the policy of how to deal with the question
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of [inability bt is submitted In the hope that it may offer sonic suggestions to
those having responsibility as to the Interpretatiou 'of the Constitution. It is
submitted that the interpretation of the Vice President's power advocated by
the Attorney Ceneral and his recommendation ias to the Cabinet acting with the
ViCe Presideit could not have bren within the contemplation of the~framersfor
the following reasons:
First it would lhave been a simple matter to have mid that the determination
of iltbfilitv should bet made hv the Vice President. The debates rather indicate
that they avoided who was t; ralse and delernifne Inability. Nor was it likely
that the' framers expected thatthe Vice President would act deterred either by.
fear of the accusati6i of usumpatlon or reluctance, induced by loyalty. Also the
exercise of such a power without explicit direction would haVe ticeii'made at his
peril and ight lead to an extraordinary situation in sonic cases as for example,
where the President'declared hinslf al;le to perform or resum.."h is dulies.
Second, at the time the Constitution was adopted, the Vice President was the
candidate who received the second largest number of votes. The supporters of
the rival candidates held quite strongly divergent views which very soon crystallized Into a party organization. It seenfs unlikely that it was fit the put'viow of
the draftsnan tiat a recently defeated
candidati for President, then serving hs
Vi66 President, should be gtoer po w er under any circunstances to determine the
ability of the successful candidate to perform iA duties.
Of course, it could not have been within the purview of the framers that the
Cabinet should have aniy responsibility in the matter as the Cabinet was not
then 'created.
As against the view that this power has been held since 1787 it should be considered that, (a) it has never ben exercised, possibly for the reason that It was
feared that the office would be vacated; (b) tht it required consremional letioa
to implement it; (c) that such implied power was not sufficiently recognized to
justify reliance on it.
The Attorney General argues that the Vice President has always had this power.
lie does not deal with the troublesome question which would arise if a President
and a Vice Presidekit lis amlrcd on the riqht of deternination. Ilis argument is
based on theqpientise that sicethe Vieo President has the duty of acting III certain
contingecies he Is clothed with th -- dut
todeterhmine when that contingency
exists. It does not, of course, so state'ih the Constitution but the Attornev'
General contends that it is a well established rule of law that a contingent power
gives its grantee the right to determine when to exercise it. In support of this
legal generalization four cases are cited. (See citation 26 to Attorney General's
memorandum.)
There was sustained iiI the Aurora case in 1813 the President's right to proclaim
termination of embargo in'the Martin ease in 1927 to calling out the militia and
in the Field case in 8i1 and the Hampton ease In 1928 the right to determine
changing state of facts to vary tariff. Each of the above acts was done in pursuance of express authority given the President by Congre-m. This is an entirely
different matter from saying that power may be'inplied where express direction
is not given.
The logical conchsion fi the interpretAilon of any constitutional language
directing that something be done would be that someone was directed to do it.
Unfortunately that does tiot appear to be so here unless Congress mder its broad
powers was expected to Implement it. If by inference it was expected that
anyone liad the power withoutt congressional implementation it is submitted that
it would be more likely to be the President himself at least where he was able and
willing. The view of the Attorney General is that It requires constitutional
amendment to give the President this power and a constitutional amendment to
divest the Vice President of a power which lie always had And apparently the
President'never had. It is submitted that not for this reason but for clarification
a constitutional amendment should be adopted to settle the question of succession
too
'ce
where the 'resident cannot resume Ills duties and of devolution of duties
where he may be able to.
April 0, 1957.
MARTIN TAYLOR.
Copy for Information of Attorney GceWra[ Cornelius W. Wickersham, Bar
Association Committee Chairman; Arthur 11, beau, Esq.; Elihu Root, Jr., Rsq.

